This was also a period where rapid development of techniques and training in the use of large guns made the inclusion of rapid-fire intermediate and secondary weapons unnecessary.

In essence, the Mississippi-class ships were smaller versions of the preceding Connecticut class with virtually the same armament and armor, but the reduction in length, engine size, and fuel capacity caused them to be slow and short-ranged.

The ships were frequently detached for special tasks, including goodwill tours, and Mississippi was used for a time as a seaplane support vessel.

Both ships took part in US military interventions in Mexico and the Caribbean, including landing Marines and supporting early air operations.

In 1914, both Mississippi-class ships were sold to Greece, being renamed Kilkis and Lemnos; this was the only sale of functional US battleships to a foreign government.

By the mid-1930s, they were relegated to reserve and auxiliary roles, and Lemnos (ex-Idaho) had her guns removed to bolster coastal fortifications.

[10] In 1903, differing concepts of the ultimate combination of guns were available, with many ideas based on various experiences and interpretations from recent naval battles, war games, and other experimentation.

In 1890, the US Navy had pioneered the use of 8-inch (203 mm) intermediate guns with the Indiana class, but had not used these consistently in their previous designs because opinions and experiences varied.

[17] These were considered an excellent compromise between weight and firepower, since limitations in gunnery control made longer-range guns impractical.

[19] In 1902, naval officers, with the backing of President Theodore Roosevelt, began to develop superior fire control techniques and equipment.

[20] The Navy considered these to be excellent for the intended role; however, in World War I North Atlantic convoy duty, the disadvantages in seakeeping outweighed the utility; they were removed from battleships remaining in US service in 1918.

[Note 8] Other analysis suggested that in fleet actions, only broadsides were effective, thus maximizing the number of centerline guns was the most efficient approach.

In the 1870s, compound armor was developed, where a hardened steel face was cemented to a softer iron backing, which prevented cracking.

[41] The amount of armor and its strength was consistent with the preceding Connecticut class and in some cases was more complete in coverage and was thicker, especially compared to the earliest ships in that series.

The U.S. Navy was slow to fully adopt turbines, and only used them exclusively in battleship production when indirect transmissions became refined (gear reduction or turbo-electric).

Even the earlier designs, including the Connecticut class with their higher freeboard, carried their secondary armament too close to the waterline.

Their motion was irregular, and their low length-to-beam ratio caused excessive rolling and pitching, which made it difficult to keep the guns on target.

The reduced length, significantly cut away from the aft, made it difficult to keep the ships on a consistent course, even in smoother waters.

23) was laid down in 1904, launched in 1905, and commissioned in early 1908,[13] She was given a shakedown cruise off the coast of Cuba in 1908, then returned to Philadelphia for final fitting out.

For the remainder of the year and into 1910, she traveled the waters off New England, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico, took a voyage up the Mississippi River, and participated in war games out of Guantanamo Bay.

[53] With the outbreak of fighting in Mexico in April 1914, Mississippi sailed to Veracruz, arriving with the first detachment of naval aviators to go into combat.

[14] Diplomatic tensions between Greece and the Ottoman Empire following the 1912–13 Balkan Wars resulted in each seeking to buy powerful warships abroad that would enable them to control the Aegean Sea.

[Note 10] The design limitations and poor seakeeping tendencies were not as critical in that strategic environment and the calmer seas of the Mediterranean.

"[13] In 1916, a serious division in the Greek government developed between King Constantine I and Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos over whether Greece should enter World War I.

French Admiral Fournet, the Commander in Chief of the Allied Squadron, perceived the Greek fleet as a menace to the Entente powers in the Aegean.

Restoration of the Greek Navy was slow due to British and French disagreements and the difficulty in guaranteeing the officers and crews would support a war against the Central Powers.

[60][Note 12] After World War I, both ships saw action in 1919 under the command of Rear Admiral G. Kakoulidis, RHN, when the Greek Navy took part in the Allied expedition in support of Denikin's White Armies in Ukraine.

[62] Lemnos was the flagship to the Second Fleet, based in Smyrna, under Rear Admiral G. Kalamidas; her mission was surveillance of the Black Sea, Dardanelles, and Asia Minor coasts.

With waning support, the Greek army was defeated, and Greece was driven out of Asia by the Turks in late 1922, resulting in years of political and economic turmoil.

[59] While they were both anchored in the Salamis Naval Base on 23 April 1941, both ships were sunk during the German invasion of Greece by Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers.