(3:3) The law was reasonably and appropriately adapted to achieving the legitimate object of protecting people from intrusive, seriously offensive communications.

(per Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) Monis v The Queen,[1] is a High Court of Australia case that dealt with the implied freedom of political communication in relation to whether or not the government may criminalise sending offensive messages through the postal system.

In determining whether s 417.12 infringed the implied freedom, the Court applied the test expounded in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,[3] as modified in Coleman v Power.

Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ held that the purpose of the law was to protect people from “intrusive”, seriously offensive communications.

In contrast, French CJ (with whom Heydon J agreed) and Hayne J held that the purpose of s 417.12 is simply to prevent the use of postal services in an offensive way.

Both French CJ and Hayne J attached a greater degree of importance to the role that offensive communications play in political discourse.

[11] French CJ, Hayne, and Heydon JJ also held that s 417.12 is invalid as it should not be read down to avoid infringement of the implied freedom.