The conference was proposed by Byrnes, without an invitation offered to France or China and without first consulting with the United Kingdom.

The conference also recognised the pro-Soviet governments in Romania and Bulgaria, granted the Soviet Union a role in post-war Japan, established international control of atomic energy, and achieved an agreement on a trusteeship in Korea - all were viewed as successes by the Soviet Union.

"[4]: 287–288 Writing in 1947, the London Economist argued that the Moscow Conference "ended the phase of post-war in which the victors clung to the belief that they could work out agreed policies... Willy-nilly, world politics moves back towards the balance of power, and issues now tend to be determined by the relative strength or influence of the two groups.

On December 29, at Gyeonggyojang, a 76 member committee to oppose the trusteeship plan was formed, which included left wing leaders such as Pak Hon-yong of the Communist Party of Korea.

[12] By January 23, unrest against the trusteeship plan had quietened somewhat, and right wing political groups stopped advocating for violence and for non-cooperation against military government.

The failure of the Moscow Conference to peacefully settle the issue of Korea ultimately led to the Korean War in 1950.

[15][16] The Soviet Union was unwilling to withdraw from Iran, citing the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship and claiming their presence was legal to protect Baku.

Reiterating their position previously voiced at the Potsdam and London conferences, the Soviet Union once again made demands for a military base in the Dardanelles.