The Court of Appeals rejected that interpretation, and so do we.Justice Stevens dissented in part, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, arguing that if "the 'supervisor' is construed too broadly", without regard to the Act's purpose, protection "is effectively nullified".

In my opinion, the National Labor Relations Board correctly found that respondent, Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., failed to prove that the six registered nurses employed at its facility in Pippa Passes, Kentucky, are "supervisors" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.... As this Court has acknowledged, the inclusion of professional employees and the exclusion of supervisors necessarily gives rise to some tension in the statutory text.

Accordingly, if the term "supervisor" is construed too broadly, without regard for the statutory context, then Congress' inclusion of professionals within the Act's protections is effectively nullified.

However, in a tour de force supported by little more than ipse dixit, the Court concludes that no deference is due the Board's evaluation of the "kind of judgment" that professional employees exercise.

[4] The Court further argues that the Board errs by not applying its limiting interpretation of the term "independent judgment" to all 12 functions identified by the statute as supervisory in nature.

Because the Board's interpretation is fully consistent both with the statutory text and with the policy favoring collective bargaining by professional employees, this Court is obligated to uphold it.