Due to Azerbaijani–British pressure, the Karabakh Council in August 1919 was forced to provisionally recognise the authority of Azerbaijan, pending the Paris Peace Conference's adjudication of the international borders of the republics within the South Caucasus.

[72] As the peace conference was inconclusive regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani governor-general Khosrov bey Sultanov, issued an ultimatum to the Armenians of Karabakh in early 1920, stipulating their acceptance of permanent inclusion into Azerbaijan.

Leaders associated with the Republic of Mountainous Armenia and the Dashnak Party attempted to organize a rebellion against Azerbaijani rule, which failed and led to the massacre and displacement of Shusha's Armenian population.

[63] Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were persecuted for choosing to attend college in Armenia instead of Azerbaijan or for supporting the FC Ararat Yerevan football club instead of Neftchi Baku.

The 1973 Soviet Top League final in which Ararat Yerevan defeated FC Dynamo Kyiv was not aired in Azerbaijan SSR, and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians that listened to the match by radio were arrested and questioned by the KGB.

[88] According to Stuart Kaufman, a professor of political science and international relations,[89] and de Waal, the first instance of violence in the conflict occurred in October 1987 when an Azerbaijani official "punished" the Armenian-populated village of Chardakhly with a raid for protesting against the appointment of a new collective-farm director.

[90] In his 2003 book Black Garden, de Waal speculated that "[p]ossibly in reaction to such incidents", Azerbaijanis in Armenia (specifically in the districts of Ghapan and Meghri) were in November 1987 driven out of their homes, arriving at Baku in two freight cars.

[91] A number of Armenian scholars and investigative journalists, however, have scrutinized these alleged incidents and argued that, outside the claims made by Azerbaijani officials, there is no evidence, archival or otherwise, to corroborate such instances of mass violence taking place, at least prior to February 1988.

[99] Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution.

[104][105] Following the incident, on March 14 the United Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favour to 7 against adopted Resolution 62/243, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

[133][137] The war was marked by the deployment of drones, sensors, long-range heavy artillery[138] and missile strikes, as well as by state propaganda and the use of official social media accounts in online information warfare.

Civilian areas, including major cities, were hit, particularly Stepanakert, Martuni, Martakert, Shushi in the Republic of Artsakh and Ganja, Barda and Tartar in Azerbaijan, with many buildings and homes destroyed.

[161][162][163][164][165][166][167][168][169] Azerbaijan has not withdrawn its troops from internationally recognised Armenian territory despite calls to do so by European Parliament, United States and France – two of the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group.

[170][171] Following the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has made numerous incursions into Armenian territory[172] and has regularly violated the ceasefire agreement, provoking cross-border fights with Armenia.

[200][201][202] Armenia has unsuccessfully requested that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Russia independently intervene due to Azerbaijan's military incursions in May 2021 and September 2022.

[245][246][247][248][249][250] The region was without gas from 22 March to 30 September 2023[251][252] and Artsakh authorities have resorted to daily 6-hour blackouts in order to ration the limited local electricity production, as Azerbaijan has prevented repair of a damaged supply line.

"[389] Cornell notes that during the war, Iran served as Armenia's "main purveyor of electricity and goods, and once the Armenian conquest of Karabakh had been completed, Iranian trucks began to supply most of the secessionist enclave's needs.

"[383] According to Bahruz Balayev, "Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and gave some humanitarian aid to the [Azerbaijani] refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities.

"[391] In 2013, Mohsen Rezaee, who was commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the war, claimed that he "personally issued an order [...] for the Republic of Azerbaijan army to be equipped appropriately and for it to receive the necessary training."

"[409] The UN Security Council Resolution 85, passed in July 1993, called on states to "refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory."

"[435] Several foreign groups fought on the Azerbaijani side: Chechen militants, Afghan mujahideen,[436] members of the Turkish ultranationalist Grey Wolves,[437] and the Ukrainian nationalist and neo-fascist UNA-UNSO.

[452][453] According to David Rieff, members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), "including a substantial number of volunteers from the diaspora, did a great deal of the fighting and dying.

[480][481][482] Two other post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan[483] and Belarus[484] tacitly support Azerbaijan's position, especially within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the CSTO, despite nominal alliance with Armenia.

The co-chair countries called it a unilateral resolution, which "threatens to undermine the peace process," but reaffirmed their "support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and thus do not recognize the independence of NK.

The report revealed that between 2012 and 2014, Azerbaijan created a slush fund of USD $2.9 billion used to bribe European and American politicians, journalists, lawmakers, and academics to lobby for Azerbaijani interests abroad, including promoting a pro-Azerbaijan agenda for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Baguirov runs the non-profit Houston-based US Azeris Network, which received a $253,150 transfer after organizing and hosting a conference in Baku attended by 10 American members of Congress.

[498] Several media outlets suggested a connection between Viktor Orbán's visit to Baku in June and the first instalment of $7.6 million transferred to the bank account in July, since by the end of August Safarov was handed over to Azerbaijan.

[103] The 1994 Bishkek Protocol called for both sides to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue aimed at demilitarization of the region, return of refugees, and the creation of a CIS peacekeeping force.

[541] On 12 June 2024, the Russian peacekeepers completed their withdrawal from the Nagorno-Karabakh region which had started in April that year, following an agreement between President Putin and his Azerbaijani counterpart Aliyev.

[563][564][565][566][546][548] Political analyst Eric Hacopian has said that "Expecting Armenians to submit to the rule of a nationalistic and undemocratic Azeri government] is the equivalent of asking 100,000 Israelis to live under Hamas.