[4][10] The National Security Act of 1947 was signed into law by President Truman on July 26, 1947, while aboard his VC-54C presidential aircraft Sacred Cow.

One of the findings that emerged was the probable role of intelligence failures linked to interservice bickering between Pearl Harbor's Army and Navy commanders, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel.

[12] Immediately following the war, confronting the Soviets was a lower priority than ending wartime austerity, balancing the federal budget, and returning to peace.

However, the shrinking budgets also created a zero-sum game environment which encouraged interservice bickering by pitting Army and Navy advocates against each other.

"[16] On August 26, 1944, future president Harry S. Truman, who was a senator at the time, wrote that "under such a set-up [of unification] another Pearl Harbor will not have to be feared" in his article "Our Armed Forces Must Be United".

On March 28, 1944, the House passed a resolution introduced by Rep. James W. Wadsworth (R-NY) to create a Select Committee On Postwar Military Policy, and this began the debate.

Due to the increasingly apparent disagreements between the two departments, committee members and military leaders agreed that a fight between them would be bad for the war effort.

By late September, Eberstadt had finished his report, and Forrestal forwarded it to the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, David Walsh.

The 200 page report's key recommendations included the following:[12][21] On January 3, 1945, the first day of the 79th Congress, Rep. Jennings Randolph (D-WV) submitted unification bill H.R.

In October, on the advice of Admiral Radford, Forrestal created the Secretary's Committee on Research on Reorganization (SCOROR) to track unification developments and help manage the Navy's response.

[22] The same month, Forrestal asked Sen. David Walsh, the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, to hold hearings of his own so that the Navy would have a chance to properly present their counterargument to the War Department Proposal.

The Eisenhower-Spaatz proposal's key points were the following:[20] The papers were forwarded to the chief of naval operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, for his thoughts.

He noted Marine Corps successes such as the prediction of the course of the Pacific War by Pete Ellis, and a history of extreme frugality that did not characterize other services.

Finally, he denounced the War Department plan as a transparent attempt to quietly marginalize and disband the Marine Corps by removing its congressional protection.

[20] On May 7th, Clark Clifford, Truman's lead for unification legislation, told General Norstad and Assistant Secretary of War Stuart Symington that the Thomas Bill could not pass in its current form, and that the Naval Affairs Committee hearings were causing it to lose more support every day.

Clifford recommended that Truman meet with the secretaries of War and the Navy and their advisors to clarify points of agreement and disagreement and find a way forward.

[20] On May 13th, Truman held the meeting, and demanded that Patterson and Forrestal find a way to break the impasse by the end of the month due to the urgency of passing unification legislation.

According to Marine Corps Brigadier General Gerald Thomas, this was due to Patterson's suggestion since the Army found Radford difficult to work with.

[20] The same month the Patterson-Forrestal Compromise went to the White House, Vandegrift appointed a second Marine Corps board to "Conduct Research and Prepare Material in Connection with Pending Legislation" led by Merritt Edson and Gerald C. Thomas.

Major witnesses of the bill who spoke in support were United States Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,[6] Under Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royall, Representative Walter G. Andrews (R-NY), Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), two colonels from the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, Director of Central Intelligence Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of the Bureau of the Budget James E. Webb, and president of General Electric Co. Charles E.

[8] Former senator Thomas C. Hart (R-CT) opposed the bill and proposed changes to the areas concerning the Navy and the Marine Corps.

[8] The president of the Reserve Officers of the Naval Services (RONS), John P. Bracken, stated that the organization opposed the bill due to the lack of input they were allowed to give.

Some of Representative Cole's amendments protecting the Navy and limiting the secretary of defense's powers were passed by voice vote (though others he offered were defeated).

[4] Representatives Judd (R-MN) and Brown (R-OH) were able to pass amendments by voice votes that required the director of Central Intelligence to be appointed by the president from civilian life and confirmed by the Senate, and Representative Judd passed an amendment allowing the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission to conduct secret operations without the inspection of the director of Central Intelligence.

[4] Amendments offered by Representatives MacKinnon (R-MN), Case (R-NJ), Mitchell (R-IN), Clason (R-MA), and Owens (R-IL) were defeated.

If the act saved money, it was obscured by an immediate return to high defense budgets following the Soviet development of nuclear weapons and the beginning of the Korean War.

However, Department of the Navy arguments regarding the dangers of placing excessive power in the hands of uniformed members of the armed forces would haunt Truman in the form of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

In an incident remembered as the Revolt of the Admirals, the secretary of the Navy resigned in protest, and naval officers began a lobbying war against a rival procurement program for the B-36 bomber.

Five days later, a Senate subcommittee began hearings regarding the Pentagon muzzling freedom of expression, and Strom Thurmond used the censorship of Heinl's article as evidence.

When the Pentagon allowed the article's publication in October, it focused the media's attention on many of the negative statements about the Marine Corps made by Truman, Eisenhower, and others.