His subject is the nature and validity of scientific knowledge and his goal is to get the reader to abandon either realism or antirealism as he understands them.
Fine argues that both realists and anti-realists share a basic "core position" about both everyday things and scientific statements.
[5] Stated another way: "…both realist and antirealist accept the results of scientific investigations as 'true,' on par with more homely [commonplace, everyday] truths."
Fine asks, if everybody, realist and antirealist included, shares a core position about entities that exist and propositions that are true (e.g., F = ma) where do the differences lie?
"[6] Spelling out what realists add to the core position takes Fine a long paragraph that boils down to simply one charge: "correspondence with the world … claims about reality.
Theorists who define truth in terms of "acceptance" (rational agreement), or behaviorism or empiricism are all "truthmongers" who are seeking some foundation, some rationale, for what they believe.
"[13] Alan Musgrave argues that Fine distorts the varied positions of antirealists especially with regard to their support of the "core.
"[15] Richard Schlagel writes "I find it utterly implausible that Fine could be serious when he argues that explanatory success could have nothing at all to do with truth.