The president's children, leading government officials and military officers have become incredibly wealthy, while much of the country's people live in poverty lacking access to basic services.
Withdrawal of foreign powers at the end of the Cold War and pressure from the international community led to the 1991 Bicesse Accord: a tentative peace process between the MLPA and UNITA.
The MLPA continued to be the recognized government of Angola and maintained access to oil exports and financial markets which provided them with the resources necessary to consolidate control over the new democratic institutions and the newly opened economy.
The president places associates in positions of power in state institutions and enterprises, then they make decisions in their public capacity to allow for a variety of legal and extra-legal opportunities to extract private profit from Angola's economy.
[8] Strategies have evolved over time from direct embezzlement of oil revenues, to a variety of schemes involving companies controlled by the party elite and their patronage networks that have consistently appropriated resources from the Angolan state via: control over loans made by state capitalized financial institutions; land and resource concessions; monopolization of business and import licences; granting un-tendered contracts to their own companies; and including unnecessary joint-venture partners and overpaid consultants in the contracts of state-owned enterprises and the government.
[1] While Angola technically has the institutional and legislative structures typical of a democracy, the normal logic of horizontal accountability and depersonalized decision making in the best interests of the public does not apply - rather, the system has been described as a facade for the international community, whereby the operators of all branches of government collude to allow each other opportunities for private gain.
Prior to the 2008 elections, the MLPA unveiled a series of major infrastructure projects with public events that had the characteristics of a campaign rally while the media simultaneously produced reports accusing UNITA of stockpiling weapons and planning a war.
Notable examples include: the cases against journalist Rafael Marquis de Morais;[21] a 6-year sentence to Cabindan activist José Marcos Mavungo in 2015; and the book club raids in 2015.
They maintained a 300 million dollar outstanding debt with Chevron throughout 2015 and in 2016, the China Development Bank suspended Sonangol's line of credit after they failed to deliver a shipment of oil.
High oil prices provided the funds and access to credit necessary to rebuild the country's infrastructure after the civil war, and a major construction boom ensued.
[33] Other notable cases of corruption related to the ownership and construction of infrastructure include: the 2015 Caculo Cabaça Hydroelectric Project;[33] the 2013 Luachimo Dam renovation;[38] the IMOB business tower in Luanda;[39] and the Lobito refinery.
[14] In April 1999 Gustavo Costa, a journalist for Expresso, wrote an article entitled Corruption Makes Victims, accusing José Leitāo, the chief presidential advisor, of embezzling government revenue.
[40] Rafael Marques de Morias, a journalist and human rights activist, wrote "The Lipstick of the Dictatorship", an article criticizing corruption in the Angolan government and President dos Santos, on July 3, 1999.
"[41][42] In 2015, Rafael Marques de Morais received a 6-month suspended sentence for slander and defamation for publishing a report about human rights abuses in Angolan diamond mines.
The accusation was that two senior Army Generals that held mining concession had been using the police and private security forces to violently displace competing diamond miners.
[44] If the political will were to become present, Angola would require improvement to its transparency and oversight mechanisms such that the existing institutions that are meant to combat corruption have the capabilities to perform that function.
[15] Despite his long history with the MLPA, his corruption record is surprisingly clean and his wealth and business interests - although significant - are not nearly on the same level as those closest to president dos Santos.
Since his election he has stated that he intends to: improve government probity and increase transparency and accountability; diversify the economy; nurture and autonomous civil society; and reduce censorship of the media.
GRECIMA had been accused of diverting hundreds of millions of dollars to a company, Semba Comunicação, owned by Isabel and Jose Filomeno dos Santos over the past decade.
[9] In March 2018, the Attorney General's office indicted Jose Filomeno dos Santos and Valter Filipe for their role in an attempt to send $500 million from the National Bank of Angola (BNA) to an account in London.
In November 2017, President Lourenço's invited IMF staff to Angola to make preparations for a formal Article IV consultation mission that was completed in March 2018.
He has maintained the support of the MLPA and the military so far; but it remains unclear whether or not he is a true reformer, or if he is merely seeking to remove the network of his predecessor, consolidate his own power, and garner some much needed domestic and international legitimacy by presenting himself as acting against corruption.
[12] Although it is possible that the entrance of a new president - in the context of an economic crisis and growing protests, international reform pressure, and assistance from foreign legal entities - could create some space for progress.
Its provisions effectively prohibit corrupt actions; however, it also lacks enforcement mechanisms beyond a clause stipulating that any contract made in violation of the law is automatically nullified.
[56] Further suspicion of Angolan transactions could increase scrutiny and create a barrier to their ability to use their illicit profits, prompt asset recovery attempts or potentially even the sanction of specific individuals.
[55] For specific cases, assistance with regard to the costs involved, investigation, human capital, asset recovery, extradition, and collaboration with foreign legal systems is theoretically available.
The investigation uncovered that BESA (partially owned by Mr. Vicente) had lost $6.8 billion in a pattern of unsecured loans, however; inexplicably, the prosecutor Orlando Figueira, decided that there was not enough evidence to proceed.
The March 2018, indictment of Jose Filomeno dos Santos and Valter Filipe was made possible by British oversight agencies that recognized the transaction as suspicious, froze the funds and referred the information to Angolan authorities.
[15] The idea that international law can constrict the financial flows of corrupt actors and provide opportunities for them to be charged in foreign courts is dependent on the participation of the countries involved.
Since 2014, China has become more cautious with their investments due to corruption complaints from Chinese construction firms and revelations that SINOPEC was losing money on its Angolan operations, and the decline in the price of oil and the consequent growth of Angola's national debt.