The other managed to cross into Israel, shooting an army tuck and entering an IDF base, killing six Israeli soldiers and wounding at least seven others before being shot dead.

The Israeli military was heavily criticized for its perceived impotence in the face of the attack, despite Israel initially detecting the hang gliders and issuing warnings to nearby posts.

In March 1981, a similar attempt was made when an intruder, using a motorized hang glider reached Haifa Bay and tossed some bombs, but was forced to land after running out of fuel and was arrested.

[6] Akar's glider failed to cross the Israeli border, and he landed in the Israeli-controlled security zone as a result of being blinded by the searchlights from Kibbutz Ma'ayan Baruch.

[1] Najah spotted a passing army truck outside the base and opened fire on it, killing the driver and wounding the corporal riding with him.

He hurled grenades and sprayed automatic fire at the sentry, who panicked and ran away, allowing him free entry into the encampment.

[10] Only following public pressure did Chief of Staff Dan Shomron decide to take further proceedings and transfer the brigade operations officer from his position.

[6][11] This gave birth to the phrase "The sentry syndrome" (Tismonet HaShin-Gimel), meaning that a system is trying to shake off responsibility for a failure by putting all the blame on the lowest possible rank.

"[11] Palestinian newspapers in the West Bank placed the story on their front headlines and in colored ink, but were prevented from printing anything but the barest details of the incident by the Israeli Military Censor.

[9] Palestinians adopted the guerrilla as a national hero and began taunting Israeli troops, crying "six to one", and the writing "6:1" appeared on walls in Gaza.