North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), is a United States Supreme Court case that forbids judicial “vindictiveness” from playing a role in the increased sentence a defendant receives after a new trial.

[1] The companion case, Simpson v. Rice, was identical except that the defendant initially pleaded guilty and received only one trial after withdrawing that plea.

The judgment was set aside in a state court proceeding two and a half years later, after Rice successfully argued his constitutional right to counsel was violated at trial.

He was retried in Alabama state court, convicted, and sentenced to twenty five years in prison, with no credit given for the time he had already served.

The Court quickly dealt with the first issue, and it determined that time previously served must be credited upon resentencing because the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits “multiple punishments” for the same offense.

[1] Nonetheless, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes limits on the trial judge's ability to increase sentences.

They would have held that “if for any reason a new trial is granted and there is a conviction a second time, the second penalty imposed cannot exceed the first penalty, if respect is had for the guarantee against double jeopardy.”[1] Justice Byron White concurred in part, but he would have allowed an increased sentence based on any “objective, identifiable data not known to the trial judge” at the original sentencing.