Statutory interpretation first became significant in common law systems, of which historically England is the exemplar.
In the United Kingdom this principle is known as parliamentary sovereignty; but while Parliament has exclusive competence to legislate, the courts (mindful of their historic role of having developed the entire system of common law) retain sole competence to interpret statutes.
According to Cross, "Interpretation is the process by which the courts determine the meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to the situation before them",[6] while Salmond calls it "the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed".
[7] Interpretation of a particular statute depends upon the degree of creativity applied by the judges or the court in the reading of it, employed to achieve some stated end.
Rather, an area of law that is not expressly mentioned in Canada's Constitution will have to be interpreted to fall under either the federal residual jurisdiction found in the preamble of s. 91—known as the Peace, Order and Good Government clause—or the provinces residual jurisdiction of "Property and Civil Rights" under s. 92(13A) of the 1867 Constitution Act.
This contrasts with other federal jurisdictions, notably the United States and Australia, where it is presumed that if legislation is not enacted pursuant to a specific provision of the federal Constitution, the states will have authority over the relevant matter in their respective jurisdictions, unless the state's definitions of their statutes conflicts with federally established or recognized rights The judiciary interprets how legislation should apply in a particular case as no legislation unambiguously and specifically addresses all matters.
The totality of the language of a particular case allows the Justices presiding to better consider their rulings when it comes to these key words and phrases.
Statutory interpretation is the process of resolving those ambiguities and deciding how a particular bill or law will apply in a particular case.
Substantive canons instruct the court to favor interpretations that promote certain values or policy results.
The avoidance canon was discussed in Bond v. United States when the defendant placed toxic chemicals on frequently touched surfaces of a friend.
[51] Therefore, the Court utilized the canon of constitutional avoidance and decided to "read the statute more narrowly, to exclude the defendant's conduct".
[59][60] Moreover, the avoidance applies only when "it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result ... and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone".
[61] "To justify a departure from the letter of the law upon that ground, the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense",[62] with an outcome "so contrary to perceived social values that Congress could not have 'intended' it".
In addition, it is argued that the canons give a credence to judges who want to construct the law a certain way, imparting a false sense of justification to their otherwise arbitrary process.
In a classic article, Karl Llewellyn argued that every canon had a "counter-canon" that would lead to the opposite interpretation of the statute.
The French philosopher Montesquieu (1689–1755) believed that courts should act as "the mouth of the law", but soon it was found that some interpretation is inevitable.
Here the statute may even be interpreted contra legem in exceptional cases, if otherwise a patently unreasonable result would follow.
The rule set out in the Convention is essentially that the text of a treaty is decisive unless it either leaves the meaning ambiguous, or obscure, or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Recourse to "supplementary means of interpretation" is allowed only in that case, like the preparatory works, also known by the French designation of travaux préparatoires.
"Purposivists often focus on the legislative process, taking into account the problem that Congress was trying to solve by enacting the disputed law and asking how the statute accomplished that goal.
"[73] Purposivists believe in reviewing the processes surrounding the power of the legislative body as stated in the constitution as well as the rationale that a "reasonable person conversant with the circumstances underlying enactment would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy"[74] Purposivists would understand statutes by examining "how Congress makes its purposes known, through text and reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history.
"[75][76] "In contrast to purposivists, textualists focus on the words of a statute, emphasizing text over any unstated purpose.
"[77] Textualists believe that everything which the courts need in deciding on cases are enumerated in the text of legislative statutes.
Intentional theory seeks to refer to as many different sources as possible to consider the meaning or interpretation of a given statute.