The non-nuclear component of the weapon is designed to penetrate soil, rock, or concrete to deliver a nuclear warhead to an underground target.
As a result of this both American and Soviet sites reached a state of "super hardening", involving defenses against the effects of a nuclear weapon such as spring- or counterweight-mounted (in the case of the R-36) control capsules and thick concrete walls (3 to 4 feet (0.9 to 1.2 m) for the Minuteman ICBM launch control capsule) heavily reinforced with rebar.
[citation needed] Major advancements in the accuracy and precision of nuclear and conventional weapons subsequent to the invention of the missile silo itself have also rendered many "hardening" technologies useless.
A weapon need only cover the silo door with sufficient debris to prevent its immediate opening to render the missile inside useless for its intended mission of rapid strike or counter-strike deployment.
Scabbing, also known as spalling, is the violent separation of a mass of material from the opposite face of a plate or slab subjected to an impact or impulsive loading, without necessarily requiring that the barrier itself be penetrated.
Rocket sled testing at Eglin Air Force Base has demonstrated penetrations of 100 to 150 feet (30 to 46 m) in concrete [citation needed] when traveling at 4,000 ft/s (1,200 m/s).
Such an explosion would generate powerful shock waves, which would be transmitted very effectively through the solid material comprising the shielding (see "scabbing" above).
By burying itself into the ground before detonation, a much higher proportion of the explosion energy is transferred to seismic shock[2] when compared to the surface burst produced from the B-53's laydown delivery.
Critics claim that developing new nuclear weapons sends a proliferating message to non-nuclear powers, undermining non-proliferation efforts.[who?]
[6]: 242 As early as 1944, the Barnes Wallis Tallboy bomb and subsequent Grand Slam weapons were designed to penetrate deeply fortified structures through sheer explosive power.
One bored through a hillside and exploded in the Saumur rail tunnel about 60 feet (18 m) below, completely blocking it, and showing that these weapons could destroy any hardened or deeply excavated installation.
[10] The B61 Mod 11, which first entered military service after the Cold war had ended, in January 1997, was specifically developed to allow for bunker penetration, and is speculated to have the ability to destroy hardened targets a few hundred feet beneath the earth.
[11] While penetrations of 20 to 100 feet (6 to 30 m) were sufficient for some shallow targets, both the Soviet Union and the United States were creating bunkers buried under huge volumes of soil or reinforced concrete in order to withstand the multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons developed in the 1950s and 1960s.
One likely Soviet Union/Russian target, Mount Yamantau, was regarded in the 1990s by Maryland Republican congressman, Roscoe Bartlett, as capable of surviving "half a dozen" repeated nuclear strikes of an unspecified yield, one after the other in a "direct hole".
[14][15] The timing of the Kosvinsky completion date is regarded as one explanation for US interest in a new nuclear bunker buster and the declaration of the deployment of the B-61 Mod 11 in 1997.
During the campaign in Tora Bora in particular, the United States believed that "vast underground complexes," deeply buried, were protecting opposing forces.
Note that with the exception of strictly earth penetrating weapons, others were designed with air burst capability and some were depth charges as well.