[1] Notably, the Ombudsman is empowered to initiate direct investigations into issues of potentially wide public interest and concern without the requirement of having a complainant.
For instance, it conducts four to eight active investigations each year, such as regarding the policy over special education services for students with emotional needs, following an enquiry by a Legislative Councillor.
The basic form is inquiry, referring to the practice that requires the organisation to offer a response for examination and give suggestions thereafter.
[5][6] It is worth noting that the Ombudsman is statutorily prevented from investigating: prosecutorial policy, legal proceedings, imposition (or variation) of condition of land grant, personnel matters and commercial transactions.
[10] Before its establishment, complaints channels in Hong Kong were uncoordinated, being made through, for example, Legislative Councillors, members of District Boards or the Urban Council.
[13] In 1986, the Government published “Redress of Grievances”, which revealed the majority view then that an independent and authorised organisation to handle complaints should be created.
[14] Scholars state that the establishment of an ombudsman was argued to be motivated by the Hong Kong Public Administration Reform that emphasised “higher efficiency and better services”, and growing political awareness and democratisation initiated from the mid-80s.
Since most officials in the body would return to the administrative department upon completion of secondment, there was concern regarding a lack of commitment on their part as well as problems of continuity and limited vision in terms of the long-term development of the Ombudsman office.
The targeted administrative departments could hinder an investigation into maladministration involving the public interest but without specific victims by refusing to disclose documents, claiming insufficient legitimate and persuasive explanation by the Commissioner.
Second, the Ombudsman was given the power to publish anonymous investigation reports on issues of public interest, at any time of the year.
Yet it is still criticised in terms of its confidentiality element in that it limits the capacity of the Commissioner to disclose the necessary information and to exercise discretionary power.
The Ombudsman was empowered to investigate these organisations regarding the Code on Access to Information,[21] However, there remained certain limitations on its actions relating to the ICAC and the police force.
[19] In terms of responsibility, the Obligation of Confidentiality expressly requires the Ombudsman and its officers to not disclose any content of their investigations or other information relating to a complaint.
[11] An expanded interpretation of confidentiality regulations was set out in 1996, stating that only when sufficient to lead to enforcement of the investigation under the Ordinance could the Ombudsman and its officers disclose its information.
As a separate legal entity, like other statutory bodies, the Ombudsman and the staff of its office are still subject to the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.
Specifically, the Ombudsman's Office, from 2001, prioritised the conduct of a wider range of preliminary enquiries towards the direct investigation of issues, which allowed for a more effective assessment of the social and financial viability of proposed reform policies, prior to their implementation.
For example, from 2003 to 2004 the annual Ombudsman's report referred to the need for a more analytical, or “global view”,[16] towards addressing maladministration within Hong Kong, given the emergence of a set of identified patterns within public complaints, most notably, though not limited to, the “reluctance in enforcement”,[16] along with interdepartmental coordination.
For example, during the 2013–2014 term,[27] a government department the Ombudsman's Office over issues relating to its contractual obligations or protocol, during a sales contract between two parties.