Ethiopia was saved from defeat and permanent loss of territory through a massive airlift of military supplies worth $1 billion, the arrival of more than 12,000 Cuban soldiers and airmen[34] and 1,500 Soviet advisors, led by General Vasily Petrov.

[35] The Ethiopian-Cuban force (equipped with 300 tanks, 156 artillery pieces and 46 combat aircraft)[27] prevailed at Harar and Jijiga, and began to push the Somalis systematically out of the Ogaden.

[51] The British Foreign Secretary proposed to keep the Somalis territories unified after the war, but was rejected by the Ethiopians and France (then controlling French Somaliland) who wanted a return to the pre-war status quo.

He laid claim to them openly, asserting that the ancient Somali coastal region of Banaadir (which encompasses Mogadishu) as well as the adjacent Indian Ocean coastline, rightfully belonged to Ethiopia based on 'historical grounds'.

[55] After the establishment of the United Nations, Ethiopia submitted a memorandum to the UN, contending that prior to the era of European colonialism, the Ethiopian empire had encompassed the Indian Ocean coastline of Italian Somaliland.

[58] In attempt to fulfill the obligations of its original protection treaties it had signed with the Somalis, the British unsuccessfully bid in 1956 to buy back the lands it had unlawfully turned over.

[64][61] In a bid to control the population of the region during the 1963 revolt, an Ethiopian Imperial Army division based out of the city of Harar torched Somali villages and carried out mass killings of livestock.

[69] Alongside Barre, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) that assumed power after President Sharmarke's assassination was led by Lieutenant Colonel Salaad Gabeyre Kediye and Chief of Police Jama Ali Korshel.

[84][85] General Samatar was assisted in the offensive by several field commanders, most of whom were also Frunze graduates:[86] The Somali Air Force was primarily organized along Soviet lines, as its officer corps were trained in the USSR.

[28][87] Somali Air Force operational aircraft In September 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie had been overthrown by the Derg military council, marking a period of turmoil.

In 1974, Ethiopia requested the delivery of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom fighters, but the US instead offered it 16 Northrop F-5E Tiger IIs, armed with AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and two Westinghouse AN/TPS-43D mobile radars (one of which was later positioned in Jijiga).

[103] Somalia and Ethiopia each blamed the other for the failure of the Aden meeting, but Castro backed Mengistu, who emphasized his pro-Soviet credentials, while Barre focused on Somali self-determination and ending Ethiopian rule in Ogaden.

Despite the clear disadvantage in fighting men, the Somalis held numerical superiority over the Ethiopians in terms of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers (APCs).

Without artillery or air support to cover their retreat, the Ethiopian defenders were effectively annihilated, with only 489 out of the 2,350 militiamen managing to return to Harar, the rest presumed dead.

A Somali tank battalion managed to push through and temporarily made the country's second major airport non-operational; the air traffic control and as many as 9 aircraft on the ground were destroyed.

The Somalis had exhausted their strength were forced to retreat, leaving behind a trail of abandoned equipment, including tanks, armored cars, artillery pieces, as well as hundreds of assault rifles and machine guns.

These setbacks were promptly attributed to "fifth columnists," leading to the execution of several officers and NCOs for alleged conspiracy with "anarchists"—primarily leftist political organizations, particularly the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP).

Losing their momentum, the Somalis provided an opening for the Ethiopians to regroup their troops, introduce fresh units and additional weaponry, and construct bunkers on the hillsides.

The Ethiopians were bolstered by deployment of 100,000 recently trained troops outfitted in new Soviet gear, around 30,000 of them, referred to as the "1st Revolutionary Liberation Army", were subsequently sent to the Somali front.

[118][34] In January 1978, the Derg established the Supreme Military Strategic Committee (or SMSC), composing of Ethiopian, Soviet, and Cuban officers to plan and direct the counter-offensive.

In a coordinated ground and air resistance involving Cuban soldiers for the first time, the Ethiopians engaged the Somalis a few miles from Harar; they launched a series of sharp thrusts against the attackers, pinning them down.

[123] Jigjiga was a pivotal point in the Somali defensive line and had major political significance to Mengistu as it had represented the site of the Ethiopians greatest defeat the previous autumn.

Hindered by the absence of air cover, dwindling supplies, and tank strength possibly below 50 percent, they were forced to retreat on March 5, narrowly avoiding an encirclement.

"[125] Recognizing that his position was untenable, Siad Barre ordered the SNA to retreat into Somalia on 9 March 1978, although Rene LaFort claims that the Somalis, having foreseen the inevitable, had already withdrawn their heavy weapons.

In one of the final actions of the war, American military historian Jonathan House observes that the Somalis had "fought a brilliant delaying battle, mauling the Ethiopian 9th brigade.

[130] Assisted by the Cuban contingent, the Ethiopian army launched a second offensive in December 1979 directed at the population's means of survival, including the poisoning and destruction of wells and killing of cattle herds.

The failure of the war aggravated discontent with the Barre regime; the first organized opposition group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), was formed by army officers in 1979.

The United States adopted Somalia as a Cold War ally from the late 1970s to 1988 in exchange for use of Somali bases it used for access to the Middle East, and as a way to exert influence in the Horn of Africa.

"[140] As expressed animosity and discontent in the north grew, Barre armed the Ogaden refugees, and in doing so created an irregular army operating inside Isaaq territories.

The armed Ogaden refugees, together with members of the Marehan and Dhulbahanta soldiers (who were provoked and encouraged by the Barre regime) started a terror campaign against the local Isaaqs,[141] raping women, murdering unarmed civilians, and preventing families from conducting proper burials.