In the hands of the government, the text was disclosed and falsely attributed to the Communist International as a real insurrection plan, thus justifying the adoption of dictatorial powers by Getúlio Vargas.

In 1963 he called it a "little course for the mentally feeble" – everyone, including those who failed, passed to the second period to fill positions made vacant by the Spanish flu, and difficult subjects were withdrawn by Congress – he also noted that it produced a number of Ministers of War, interventors and other illustrious people.

In order to leave no doubt about his distance from the PRP, he joined the Partido Orientador Trabalhista, a "puny party that existed only in imagination" that elected a councilor in the Federal District and had his mandate revoked.

[19] Head of the AIB's secret service and called from Santa Catarina to the General Staff of the Army in Rio de Janeiro, in August 1937 Plínio Salgado asked Mourão to write "Information Bulletin No.

[20][21][22][23] Plínio Salgado disapproved of the text, with its "massacres, fires, kidnappings, confiscation of private property, attacks on the clergy, appeal to sexuality", as exaggerated and unrealistic.

[35] In the same year, Góis Monteiro denounced the falsehood of the Cohen Plan and pointed to "an integralist official" as the source, disclaiming, however, all blame; the document would have reached the EME and leaked while investigations into its veracity were ongoing.

Mourão implemented the prohibition of access to radio and television to oppositionist Carlos Lacerda and presided over the Brazilian delegation at the Radio-Communications Commission in Geneva, Switzerland in 1959, where the standardization of world frequencies was discussed.

Initially concerned with the poor state of his division, he became alarmed at a dinner with Brizola and general Osvino when the Federation of Agriculture of Rio Grande do Sul (FARSUL) congress was taking place on 7 January 1962.

Together with his vision of what was happening in the city — the memory of divided garrisons and leftist sergeants during the succession crisis of the previous year, the heightened spirits left by it and union and communist agitation, especially on the railroads — Mourão concluded there could be a conspiracy against the regime.

[59] For two years, two months and twenty-three days Mourão was "a good organizer, considered courageous and impetuous" at civil and military circles and at state and national levels.

He was a "bait", diverting the attention of the government[60] — his conspiracy was open and well known[61] — and instilled the spirit of the garrisons against Goulart, but he was also feared for his impetuosity, which they tried to neutralize so that his efforts would not be lost in a sudden movement.

[62] Mourão also confirmed to Hélio Silva that he knew about the conspirators contact with the United States and the possibility of an American navy squadron approaching the Brazilian coast.

He sought funding for the opposition in the electoral campaign and in Rio de Janeiro he enlisted admiral Sílvio Heck to his cause, capable of capturing other high ranking officials including marshal Odylio Denys.

A task force — three infantry battalions, one from São Paulo's Military Police and a group of howitzers — would leave at 7:00 PM and travel down Via Dutra as quickly as possible towards Guanabara, arriving at least as far as Barra do Piraí.

In order to dispel suspicions, he angrily left a ceremony in which the Secretary of Justice of the State declared that there was "a communist movement led from the Alvorada Palace, by the President of the Republic himself".

The act was not convincing and in these final months São Paulo already lost strength, with the military conspiracy flowing to general Agostinho Cortes, linked to Golbery and IPES.

[74] In his home state he had contact with two presidential candidates: Juscelino Kubitschek and governor Magalhães Pinto (UDN), the latter was one of the three great figures of the coup in Minas Gerais.

In Juiz de Fora, even civilians — "teachers, businessmen, dentists, lawyers, doctors and taxi drivers" — were invited to lectures at the 4th Military Region/Infantry Division's HQ.

Magalhães Pinto, the civilian leader of the "revolution", promised to deliver a manifesto demanding the deposition of the president, giving the necessary political support to the military deployment already on Saturday night, erupting in Rio de Janeiro at dawn on Sunday.

[81] Suspecting that the vague terms of the governor's manifesto were Magalhães way of keeping himself away from the movement in case of failure, in his memoirs Mourão called him a traitor and claimed to have ordered Guedes to arrest him, who did not want to obey.

Many soldiers censured Mourão for ignoring the authority of Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva, whom he made amends for, and consider him untimely, but some believed that it was not an impetuous act, but the culmination of a long process.

[99] With the PMMG and the Federal Army in Minas Gerais under his command, Mourão carried out operations "Silêncio", controlling telecommunications, "Gaiola", arresting "suspicious elements" already monitored by the police, and "Popeye", moving troops against Rio de Janeiro and Brasília.

[111] Mourão, in turn, resigned himself to fatigue, concern for Kruel — who, at least, did not come to power either — and for thinking that Costa e Silva, although illegitimate, was his hierarchical superior and "the legal order possible to get".

[126] According to him, he had the possibilities of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, but Costa e Silva did not want to remove Poppe de Figueiredo from command of the 3rd, because "I [Mourão] cannot insult the boy who entered Porto Alegre in a war operation!

[128] However, his statements were considered a hindrance to the government, which transferred him to the reserve and appointed him justice at the Superior Military Court (STM),[129] the place of "honorable ostracism of dissidents".

Claiming a "very hard line" in August 1964, he took positions similar to those of admiral Heck and accused the Sorbonne Group of being composed only of sympathizers of the "revolution" who stole his victory and diverted its course.

[129] In 1966, he clashed with Péri Constant Bevilacqua in the STM, opposing the amnesty for those punished by the coup,[135] and, despite already being on a dissident path, in October he rejected the Declaration of Lisbon by Carlos Lacerda against the dictatorship.

[147] Laurita Mourão tried to stop the publication in court and it only occurred the following year,[148] and only in Porto Alegre, as no publisher in Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo would accept it.

[149] Entitled Memórias: a verdade de um revolucionário, it covers the 1960s, with chapters on Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and the Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva governments, but also includes a preface, Mourão's diary from 1955 to 1964, a correspondence with Auro de Moura Andrade in 1970 about the conjuncture of 1962, an analysis of the conjuncture made in January, a report by the Civilian Staff of São Paulo after Mourão's departure from the state and a letter received from Raul Pilla in June 1964 about parliamentarism.

[152] Marshal José Machado Lopes defined the book as "the apology of its author as a revolutionary leader, a great liberal-democrat and self-sacrificing patriot", who unfairly lowers the image of his military colleagues to benefit his own.