On War
[1] It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on military strategic thinking.
[3] His ten-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state.
The insights he gained from his political and military experiences, combined with a solid grasp of European history, provided the basis for his work.
Regarding Clausewitz’s intellectual-cultural background, Azar Gat argues that he expressed in the field of military theory the main themes of the Romantic reaction against the worldview of the Enlightenment, rejecting universal principles and stressing historical diversity and the forces of the human spirit.
That corresponded in every respect with the spirit of the time when the French Revolution and the conflicts that arose from it had caused the evolution of conscript armies and guerrillas.
Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state might serve as Means to achieve the set goal.
"[13] According to Azar Gat, the "general message" of the book was that "the conduct of war could not be reduced to universal principles [and is] dominated by political decisions and moral forces.
Clausewitz's use of a dialectical method to construct his argument, led to frequent modern misinterpretation because he allegedly explores various often-opposed ideas before he came to conclusions.
[6] The centerpiece of Clausewitz’s theory of war throughout his life was his concept of all-out fighting and energetic conduct leading to the great battle of annihilation.
Accordingly, Clausewitz disparaged the significance of the maneuver, surprise, and cunning in war, as distracting from the centrality of battle,[23] and argued that defense was legitimate only if and as long as one was weaker than the enemy.
Gat further argues the readers’ miscomprehension of the theory in On War as complete and dialectical, rather than a draft undergoing a radical change of mind, has thus generated a range of reactions.
By contrast, after 1945, during the nuclear age, his reputation has reached a second pinnacle for his later acceptance of the primacy of politics and the concept of limited war.
[27] He alleges that Clausewitz does not address any form of intra/supra-state conflict, such as rebellion and revolution, because he could not theoretically account for warfare before the existence of the state.
