Operation Écouvillon

[8] Despite these differing viewpoints, the Sahrawi resistance, primarily led by dissidents with the support of local tribes, received partial funding from the Moroccan monarchy,[9] which viewed the struggle against Spanish occupiers favorably.

[15] Initially popular within the nationalist Istiqlal party, the doctrine eventually gained broader acceptance, including within the Moroccan monarchy, particularly after the actions of the Army of Liberation in the Spanish Sahara and what is now Mauritania.

[13] The Governor of Mauritania, Albert-Louis Mouragues, supported the request for additional military resources, citing fears of potential Algerian independence movements and Moroccan expansionism.

[12][14] France's military support for Spain was therefore influenced by a desire to safeguard its financial interests in the region while also preventing the proliferation of independence movements into sub-Saharan Africa.

[17] On 23 November 1957, Moroccan forces cut the telephone lines, allowing insurgents to launch a series of coordinated attacks on strategic locations, including the airfield and arms depots, as well as various points within the town.

[20] The situation escalated with the offensives launched by the Armée de Libération Nationale-Sud (ALN-South) in the Spanish-held Saharan territories, compelling Spain to pursue a resolution through diplomatic means.

[14] From 31 January to 4 February 1958, the French Air Force engaged in active propaganda efforts, distributing leaflets over the targeted villages to prepare the local population for the operation.

A notable issue was the delivery of drinking water, which was initially dropped into the open sea in jerrycans and subsequently recovered by the Spanish forces as the tide receded.

[23] Furthermore, the Spanish troops faced difficulties with their uniforms, as they were equipped with winter attire unsuitable for the harsh desert conditions, while the French forces had appropriate outfits for the environment.

In terms of food supplies, the French troops had access to a range of high-nutritional-value items, including fruit juices, designed to combat dehydration and prevent avitaminosis in the arid climate.

To minimize the risk of clashes with the Moroccan Armed Forces (MAF) and ensure Morocco's neutrality in the conflict, geographical limits defining the area of operation were carefully established.

Since the conflict was primarily Spanish, France faced the challenge of justifying its involvement to both the international community and the French Socialists, who were largely opposed to forming an alliance with Francoist Spain.

This narrative emphasized the potential for instability in the region and the perceived threat of Moroccan expansionism, framing these developments as direct risks to the security of French interests in Mauritania and the surrounding areas.

[14] By framing the operation as a necessary response to protect stability and counter expansionist threats, France sought to create an acceptable rationale for its military involvement while also mitigating potential backlash from domestic and international audiences.

This strategic communication effort was crucial to facilitating the military cooperation between France and Spain, particularly in light of the complex political landscape surrounding the decolonization process in North Africa.

[24][25] Several sources report that the Royal Armed Forces of Morocco assisted France and Spain during this operation, aiming to neutralize elements of the Army of Liberation (AL).

[27] The document reported that the insurgent force near Gueltat Zemmour consisted of approximately 600 to 800 personnel, with an estimated 25% comprising Moroccan soldiers under Algerian commander Si Salah.

[11] Despite this initial success, French generals adopted a cautious approach, recognizing the significant military advantage held by Franco-Spanish forces while also considering the potential limitations of this advantage in securing local support for the Moroccan AL.[21][23] This cautious stance reflected an awareness of the complex dynamics on the ground, including the need to manage relations with local populations and the risks associated with prolonged military engagement in the region.

From 10 to 20 February 1958, Spanish troops effectively routed the Sahrawi resistance fighters, achieving notable recoveries, including the reclamation of the town of Es-Semara and the surrounding area of Dcheira.

Despite facing a determined resistance, the combination of superior equipment, coordinated tactics, and the pressure of ongoing defeats led the insurgents to withdraw from key positions.

[7] This operation not only reinforced the presence of Franco-Spanish influence in the region but also had lasting implications for the local political landscape as the dynamics of power shifted in the wake of military engagement.

For instance, the French Air Force's bombing of Sakiet Sidi Youssef just two days prior to the operation's official commencement shifted the international focus onto the event.

Moreover, as noted by Elsa Assidon, Morocco's official response was notably ambiguous, with the government expressing minimal objections to "French troop movements," further ensuring the operation remained confidential.

[19] In addition to its military objectives, Operation Écouvillon was also accompanied by propaganda and influence-peddling activities aimed at winning the support of the local population, particularly the Berber tribes.

[7] The combination of military actions and these softer tactics yielded positive results for the French forces, allowing them to gain support from some segments of the Reguibat tribes.

[34] Following the swift and decisive nature of Operation Écouvillon, the region experienced a period of relative peace, with Sahrawi insurgents refraining from significant military actions for some time.

This lull allowed for a temporary stabilization of the situation in the area, as both colonial powers and local populations adjusted to the new dynamics established by the operation and the subsequent agreements.

[13] Evrard highlights the significance of the Tinketrat rally in April 1958, during which the Reguibat pledged their allegiance to Moktar Ould Daddah, as a direct consequence of Operation Écouvillon.

[14] The successful coordination and mobilization of both French and Spanish forces, alongside local support, showcased the military's ability to navigate complex circumstances effectively.

Furthermore, in 2011, Moroccan filmmaker Rahal Boubrik released a documentary about Operation Écouvillon, utilizing archive footage to provide a retrospective view of the events.

Map of the Sahara as divided up at the time of the operation.
Phosphate quarries (France).
Monument dedicated to the Ifni War shahids in the town of Sidi Ifni .
Drinking water was transported in jerrycans originally used to contain petrol.
View of the town of Smara in 2010 (this town is the first official scene of the operation).
Tunisian satirical caricature of the bombing of Sakiet.
Map showing the distribution of the Reguibat tribe.
Current emblem of the Mauritanian Armed Forces .