[22] However, despite earlier assurances by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,[23] by the end of 2015,[10] Russia began backing Syrian forces; and together with the occurrence of the 2015 Suruç bombing, which it attributed to ISIS as part of the wider Turkish-ISIS conflict, Turkey re-invoked Article 4.

There were several identified launches of rockets from within Syrian territory, but none of the missiles were aimed at Turkey or entered Turkish airspace to date, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade paratroopers secured NATO missile-defense sites [28] In 2019, again NATO members looked to wind down operations, as Italian SAMP/T batteries left the region, and Spain discussed removing Patriot batteries from Incirlik.

The Turkish government retaliated with Operation Spring Shield, threatening a direct war between Turkey and Russia.

[32] This rapid turn of events led to another Article 4 meeting and further NATO support and expansion of the operation.

[33] Due to this, a direct meeting was held between Erdogan and Putin, a no-fly zone was established in the Idlib province, and Russian and Turkish forces entered into joint patrols,[34] as part of an agreement to help de-escalate the situation.