After securing LZ Finch, the SLF directed the BLT to search new objectives consisting of the coastal villages of Thom Thâm Khê (16°44′41″N 107°22′48″E / 16.7446°N 107.38°E / 16.7446; 107.38) and Tho Trung An.

[1] The operation started with Company L, 3/1 Marines landing on Green Beach at 11:00 on 26 December and proceeding to LZ Finch meeting minimal opposition.

As the lead platoon of Company L approached the edge of the village a concealed PAVN/VC force opened up with a devastating barrage of machine gun, rifle, Rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and mortar fire inflicting numerous casualties.

After two airstrikes followed by naval gunfire Company L assaulted the village but were again met by heavy fire killing Captain Hubbell and his radio operator.

[1]: 178 After hitting the area with 81 mm mortar fire Company K attacked the south of Thâm Khê meeting strong resistance and were unable to make any progress until 2 tanks arrived at their position.

[1]: 179 On the morning of 28 December Companies K and I renewed their assault on Thâm Khê meeting initial heavy fire but they secured the village by midday.

This tunnel system supported ground level bunkers for machine guns, RPGs and small arms around the entire perimeter of the village.

ARVN forces operating northwest of Thâm Khê found over 100 bodies from the 116th Battalion in sand dunes, the PAVN had apparently evacuated its casualties through the gap between Companies K and L during the night.

[1]: 179 At 18:00 on 31 December a New Year’s truce went into effect and SLF Bravo began returning to its ships and by 11:30 on 2 January the BLT had left the operational area.

[1]: 179 On 30 December 1967 Brigadier General Jacob E. Glick ordered an investigation into why the 3/1 Marines had suffered such heavy casualties at Thâm Khê.

Benskin sent his initial report to Glick on 5 January 1968 and it emphasized the strength of the PAVN's positions with fields of fire permitting them to "neutralize efforts of all attacking units except Company K when supported by tanks."

In reality it was a water-borne/helicopter landing of a bare boots unsupported Marine infantry battalion moving 8 to 10 miles from the water's edge to objectives that lacked even a shred of intelligence to justify the operation.