United Kingdom 1941 1942 Associated articles Operation Battleaxe (15–17 June 1941) was a British Army offensive during the Second World War to raise the Siege of Tobruk and re-capture eastern Cyrenaica from German and Italian forces.

The British achieved mixed results on the second day, being pushed back on their western flank and repulsing a big German counter-attack in the centre.

In late March 1941, soon after the arrival of the Afrika Korps in Tripoli, Libya to reinforce the Italians, the Axis forces quickly captured the British front line position at El Agheila and by mid-April, had reached as far as Sallum, Egypt.

Having been informed by General Wavell that the Western Desert Force was vastly inferior to the Axis forces now in Africa, Churchill ordered that a convoy of tanks and Hawker Hurricanes, Operation Tiger (Convoy WS 58), be sailed through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape of Good Hope to cut forty days off the journey.

[11][i] The German Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) sent General Friedrich Paulus to Africa to investigate the situation.

With Operation Barbarossa imminent, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, ordered Rommel not to advance further or attack Tobruk again.

[14] The plan was based on intelligence information, which incorrectly indicated that 2⁄3 of the German tank strength was at Tobruk, which would put the British at a decisive material advantage on the frontier.

[13] Once the battle began, fighters were to patrol defensively over Allied ground forces, while medium bombers were to stand by to engage Axis columns.

[26] Beresford-Peirse chose Sidi Barrani as, even though it was more than a five-hour drive from the battlefield, it was equipped with the most advanced airfield for reconnaissance aircraft and was also the most forward position from which communications could be maintained with Maaten Baggush.

[3] Though Brevity had failed to yield any territory to the British, it showed Rommel that his front line defences were quite easy to breach.

Anticipating further British attacks, the Axis forces created a line of fortified positions from Halfaya to Sidi Aziz, placing a number of anti-tank guns and anti-tank mines on the Halfaya Pass, Point 206 (south of Forth Capuzzo) and on Point 208 (west of Fort Capuzzo on the Hafid Ridge).

[27] The primary responsibility of the frontier defence was charged to the 15th Panzer Division, which had received a new commander, General Walter Neumann-Silkow, on 8 June.

[31] On the eastern side, at 05:15, Coast Force—commanded by Brigadier Reginald Savory and charged with capturing Halfaya Pass, started to move on to their objective.

[38] Below the escarpment four of the Matildas were disabled by anti-tank mines which were supposed to have been cleared; this blocked the path of the remaining two and reduced the small tank force to acting in a pillbox capacity.

[35] The Rajputana Rifles and Mahrattas made several attempts to reach the pass but were repelled each time; the former lost their commanding officer in the final attack.

[39] In the centre, the 7th Royal Tank Regiment reached Fort Capuzzo by noon and scattered the defenders, who retreated north to join the 15th Panzer Division, between them and Bardia.

The 8th Panzer Regiment skirmished briefly and then feigned a disorderly retreat to lure Matilda tanks into a chase into range of concealed anti-tank guns.

[42] In response to the British capture of Capuzzo and concerned with a possible attack on Sollum and Bardia, Rommel ordered the 5th Light Division to Sidi Azeiz ready for a possible counter-attack.

[41] This development posed a serious problem for the brigade, as the cruiser tanks were armed with 2-pounder anti-tank guns which lacked the High Explosive (HE) rounds needed to engage infantry and artillery.

[42] Over thirty German tanks from a battalion of the 5th Panzer Regiment, part of the 5th Light Division which had earlier been stationed north at Sidi Azeiz, were seen arriving from the west.

[48] By the end of the first day, Fort Capuzzo had been captured but not Halfaya Pass and Hafid Ridge and the British had lost a significant number of tanks.

[50] Through the wireless intelligence service, Rommel had a fairly clear picture of the British situation, including their losses, problems and the new orders issued by Beresford-Peirse.

To prevent the re-deployment of Matildas, either to reinforce the 7th Armoured Brigade as Beresford-Peirse planned or to assist the British forces at Halfaya, Neumann-Silkow was ordered to attack Capuzzo.

Messervy saw this lack of progress and disregarded Beresford-Peirse's orders to release his tanks and decided to retain the few remaining Matildas he had until some breach of the Axis defences could be made.

[53] The attack went poorly from the onset, as the 15th Panzer Division ran directly into heavy artillery from 25-pounders which had been brought up during the night and Matilda tanks in entrenched positions.

During the running skirmish, the British tanks had a few successful attacks against unarmoured German transport vehicles, but they found themselves at a significant disadvantage when they engaged the panzers, who utilised an extremely effective tactic against them.

[61] At Capuzzo, the early morning movements of the 15th Panzer Division led Messervy to believe another attack was imminent, and he thus cancelled Beresford-Peirse's orders for the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the 7th so that they could be retained.

[60] This message was also intercepted by the Germans, as Rommel later wrote, It sounded suspiciously as though the British commander no longer felt himself capable of handling the situation.

[64] At 10:45, Messervy contacted Creagh over the radio and, speaking Hindustani for security, informed him that he had ordered a retreat of his infantry from Capuzzo and Halfaya, to begin at 11:00.

[2] RAF fighter losses were caused by lack of pilot training and the need for continuous air cover; standing patrols could only be maintained by a few aircraft while the bulk were in transit to the battlefield, being repaired, rearmed and refuelled.