Several commando units of the Israel Defence Forces launched dozens of operations against Hizbullah targets in Lebanon.

The target was a recoil-less gun positioned near a former IDF outpost called Shaked, that had been firing at the Israeli military base at Avivim.

Suddenly the Israeli soldiers realized that they had walked into a "Nature Reserve", a defensive system of bunkers, tunnels, concealed firing positions and CCTV surveyance.

During the night 1-2 August a combined force of 200 IDF commandos landed outside the city of Baalbek in eastern Lebanon.

One force occupied a local hospital, Dar al-Hikma, believed by IDF to have contained an Hizbullah headquarter.

Many sources claim that the actual target of the raid was the capture or killing of senior Hizbullah leaders, but this was never officially clarified.

According to an opinion piece in Jerusalem Post by Gal Perl Finkel a total of 150 Hezbollah targets, including 40 rocket launchers, were destroyed.

[21] Sayeret Matkal commandos launched a second operation in the Baalbek region, about a week after the declaration of the cease fire in Lebanon.

On 19 August, a force dressed up in Lebanese army uniforms was landed by helicopter close to the town of Bodai.

Lebanese sources suggested that the target of the operation was Mohammad Yazbek, a senior Hizbullah leader who had his office in the town.

This would prove fatal, since there was no possibility to stop short range rockets without actually occupying the territory and destroying Hizbullah’s firing positions.

Among senior levels of both Israeli politicians and military, there were exaggerated expectations that special operations would play a decisive role in the outcome of the war.

The Winograd commission characterized the relatively limited use of special forces to suppress Hizbullah rocket fire as "astonishing".

[27] Leslau writes thar while "the SOF [Special Operations Forces] conducted impressive operations… which demonstrated the weakness of Hezbollah’s rear, they had no strategic utility and did not affect the progress or outcome of the war.

They did not reduce the number of rockets fired against Israel, or weaken significantly the strength of Hezbollah’s military force".

"[31] Former chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon, a sharp critic of IDF conduct during the Lebanon war, questioned whether the raid on Baalbek was "justified in terms of risk, cost and benefit" and whether it was not simply "an adventure.

"[32] A recently retired member of the IDF General Staff characterized more than half of the wartime special missions as "feel good" operations marginally relevant or even counterproductive to the overall campaign.