Operation Black Buck
Shrikes hit two of the less valuable and rapidly replaced secondary fire control radars, causing some casualties among the Argentine crews.
Nonetheless, at six-monthly intervals the Defence chiefs reviewed other possible areas of conflict around the globe, including the Falkland Islands.
[2][3] Without aircraft able to cover the long distance, the Royal Air Force (RAF) could not envisage carrying out operations in the South Atlantic.
[1][4] In 1961, a Vulcan had flown non-stop from the UK to RAAF Base Richmond near Sydney in Australia, a much greater distance,[7] but that was with pre-positioned aerial tankers along the route, which would not be possible flying from Ascension.
At 0400Z on 20 April, a Victor piloted by Squadron Leader J. G. Elliott, took off from Ascension, accompanied by four supporting tankers to supply fuel for the outbound journey.
[15] They were based at RAF Waddington in the UK and assigned to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for nuclear operations; neither aerial refuelling nor conventional bombing had been practised for several years.
One of the reasons for the use of the Vulcans was to conserve Sea Harrier resources for the air defence of the naval forces, but the plan required them to conduct a daylight photo reconnaissance sortie over the airfield for the purpose of damage assessment.
Rear Admiral Derek Reffell proposed that Harriers be used to suppress the airfield radars prior to the Vulcan attack in addition to conducting the post-attack photo reconnaissance.
The following day he was informed that Black Buck had been approved, and that the photo reconnaissance was required not just for damage assessment, but to refute Argentine allegations of indiscriminate bombing.
AN/ALQ-101 electronic countermeasure pods from Blackburn Buccaneer aircraft at RAF Honington were fitted to the wings of the Vulcans on improvised pylons, using the attachment points originally intended for the Skybolt missile.
A search of the supply dumps at Waddington and RAF Scampton located the 90-way panels, which were fitted and tested, but finding enough septuple bomb carriers proved harder, and at least nine were required.
suite at London Terminal Control Centre in West Drayton, Middlesex, took the Vulcan bombers and Victor tankers 250 miles off Land's End in the Atlantic Ocean, where the vast majority of their aerial refuelling training was completed, always at night.
[15][34] With a full load of bombs and fuel, a sixth crew member and a fresh coat of paint, the Vulcans were well over their rated maximum takeoff weight of 204,000 pounds (93,000 kg).
[32] To verify their position and minimise the risk of civilian casualties, the H2S radar was successfully locked on to the 2,313-foot (705 m) peak of Mount Usborne, 33 miles (53 km) west of Stanley, before the automated bombing control system was engaged.
[44] Withers climbed away from the airfield and headed nearly due north to a planned rendezvous with a Victor some way off the Brazilian coast near Rio de Janeiro.
[50] Later that morning, twelve 800 Naval Air Squadron Sea Harriers were dispatched from the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes to attack targets on East Falkland.
[44] One of the Sea Harriers was struck by a 20 mm anti-aircraft round, which damaged its fin and tailplane; the aircraft managed to return to Hermes and was quickly repaired.
[44] The other three 800 NAS Sea Harriers attacked the airfield at Goose Green with cluster bombs shortly after the raid on Port Stanley, resulting in the destruction of a Pucará and severe damage to another two.
[60] The cratering at the western end of the runway prevented Argentine engineers from extending it sufficiently to make it capable of accommodating high-performance combat aircraft.
[32] The runway remained in use by Hercules and light transport aircraft, allowing the Argentinians to fly in critical supplies and evacuate wounded personnel.
The main target was a Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 long-range 3D radar that the Argentine Air Force deployed during April to guard the airspace surrounding the Falkland Islands.
[28] The bombs were fused in error to explode on impact; the end of the war was in sight and the intention had been for them to air burst to destroy aircraft and stores without damaging the runway, which would soon be needed for RAF Phantom FGR.2 operations after the Falkland Islands were recaptured.
[61] Woodward has stated that he "fully expected" Hercules flights to continue after Black Buck One, but that he "did not care too much about that" at the time since, unlike fast jets, they were not a direct threat to the naval forces.
The fact that the British forces could penetrate Argentine air defences and attack the airfield had the desired effect in relation to preventing fast jet usage of the Port Stanley airstrip as the Argentine military command could not risk stationing its fast jets and the infrastructure necessary to operate them on the islands if they could be destroyed on the ground, irrespective of the operational status of the runway.
Admiral Woodward considered it vital to keep fast jets from using Port Stanley, to reduce the threat of air attack on the British aircraft carriers.
Starting on 1 May, the Royal Navy attacked Port Stanley with aerial bombing by Sea Harriers and naval bombardment, in order to hamper Argentinian repair efforts.
Apparently, the logic behind this statement was that if the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the [sic] Buenos Aires was well within range as well and was vulnerable to similar attacks.
On 29 April, Argentine radars at Puerto San Julián detected a suspected British air strike and aircraft from there were moved to Comodoro Rivadavia, but they still remained in southern Argentina.
[79] The author of Vulcan 607, Rowland White, claimed that Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo was led to believe that Black Buck One was the prelude to a full-scale landing by the British.
A United States Marine Corps study concluded that:The most critical judgement of the use of the Vulcan centres on the argument that their use was "...largely to prove [the air force] had some role to play and not to help the battle in the least."
