Luxembourg The Netherlands Belgium France Britain 1941–1943 1944–1945 Germany Strategic campaigns Operation Bodenplatte ([ˈboːdn̩ˌplatə]; "Baseplate"), launched on 1 January 1945, was an attempt by the Luftwaffe to cripple Allied air forces in the Low Countries during the Second World War.

The goal of Bodenplatte was to gain air superiority during the stagnant stage of the Battle of the Bulge so that the German Army and Waffen-SS forces could resume their advance.

British signals intelligence recorded the movement and buildup of German air forces in the region, but did not realise that an operation was imminent.

[3] Post-battle analysis suggests only 11 of the Luftwaffe's 34 air combat Gruppen (groups) made attacks on time and with surprise.

Although German aircraft production peaked in 1944 the Luftwaffe was critically short of pilots and fuel, and lacked experienced combat leaders.

As winter came, rain and mud turned airfields into quagmires, so large-scale air and land operations came to a halt.

[7] The situation might well have continued until the spring thaw had the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) not launched the Battle of the Bulge on 16 December 1944.

Part of the planning for the German land operation required the attack to be conducted under the cover of bad winter weather, which kept the main Allied asset, the Tactical Air Forces, on the ground.

His experiences in Poland, in France, and during the early campaigns on the Eastern Front had moulded him into an outstanding ground attack specialist, making him an ideal candidate for planning Bodenplatte.

[13] On 15 December, this plan was worked out with the help of the Luftwaffe's Jagd-Geschwaderkommodore, among them Gotthard Handrick (Jagdabschnittsführer Mittelrhein; Fighter Sector Leader Middle Rhine), Walter Grabmann and Karl Hentschel, commanders of 3. and 5.

[14] However, in a blunder, the planners had set flight paths that took many units over some of the most heavily defended areas on the continent, namely the V2 launch sites around The Hague.

[15] Some of the AAA units had been warned about the air operation but were not kept up to date with developments about changing timetables and the flight plan of German formations.

[4] After five years of war and heavy attrition many of the Luftwaffe's pilots were inexperienced and poorly trained, deficient in marksmanship and flight skills.

Maps were also only half complete, identified only enemy installations, and left out flight paths, lest the document fall into Allied hands enabling them to trace the whereabouts of German fighter bases.

Jagddivision message was intercepted confirming that the locations for emergency landing grounds during a "special undertaking" had remained unchanged.

[10] Allied intelligence, by 16 December, had monitored the reshuffling of both German Army and Luftwaffe formations opposite the American-held front at the Ardennes.

The formation was mixed; Stab., (headquarters flight or Stabschwarm, attached to every Geschwader), I. and II./JG 1 operated the Fw 190 while the III./JG 1 flew the Bf 109.

This return for around 60 enemy aircraft (54 on the ground) cannot be considered a complete success, although the damage at St. Denijs Westrem and Maldegem had been significant.

[42] At 09:12, JG 2 crossed the front line at Malmedy and was greeted by an enormous volume of Allied ground fire.

126 Wing RCAF was based there and had dispatched its 411 and 442 Squadrons on recce missions early that morning so the majority of its units were airborne.

145 Wing RAF was missed completely and considering the large number of targets the destruction was light; just 12 Spitfires were destroyed.

[60] The USAAF XIX Tactical Air Command had established a strong presence in northeast France and was supporting the U.S. 3rd Army.

[82] The leader of the 487th squadron, 352nd Fighter Group, John Charles Meyer, anticipated German activity and had a flight of 12 P-51s about to take off on a combat patrol when the attack began.

Before the target was reached, some 14 Fw 190D-9s were forced to turn back due to AAA damage or mechanical difficulties.

According to Emil Clade (leading III./JG 27), the AAA positions were not manned, and aircraft were bunched together or in lines, which made perfect targets.

[106][107] Another source states that 13 Wellingtons were destroyed, as were five Mosquitoes, four Auster and five Avro Ansons from the Tactical Air Forces 2nd Communications Squadron.

[110][111] Jagdgeschwader 3 (JG 3) and Kampfgeschwader 51 (KG 51) were tasked with eliminating the Allied units at the Eindhoven base and Gilze-Rijen airfield.

Possibly on account of the launch crew sighting the American fighter, the rocket was quickly lowered from a near launch-ready 85° elevation to 30°.

The Germans, however, launched Bodenplatte under a set of conditions, such as poor planning and low pilot skill, which clearly indicated any advantage gained would be outweighed by possible losses.

In strategic terms, German historian Werner Girbig wrote, "Operation Bodenplatte amounted to a total defeat".