French armored platoons, airborne units and troops delivered by landing craft to the coast of central Annam, modern-day Vietnam, attempted to sweep forces of the communist Viet Minh from the critical Route 1.

A secondary phase of mopping-up operations began in a "labyrinth of tiny villages" where French armored forces suffered a series of ambushes.

From then on, the French focused on creating strong fortified positions, against which Viet Minh General Giáp could pit his forces, culminating in Operation Castor and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

[15][16] In October 1952, fighting around the Red River Delta spread into the Thai Highlands, resulting in the Battle of Nà Sản, at which the Viet Minh were defeated.

Navarre spoke of a new offensive spirit in Indochina – based on strong, fast-moving forces[13] – and the media quickly took Operation Camargue to be the "practical realization" of that.

[15] In December 1950, the United States, concerned about growing Chinese Communist influence, started providing military aid to the French, with a first payment of US$15 million.

[20] In the spring of 1953, the Viet Minh launched campaigns in Laos and succeeded in linking up Laotian territorial gains with their bases in north-western Vietnam.

[23] The Viet Minh paramilitary forces around Route One originated mainly from a region of fortified villages dispersed along sand dunes and salt marshes between Hué to the south,[24] and Quang Tri to the north.

[25] French forces had suffered from Viet Minh ambushes, an attack that the latter had become very proficient at throughout the war, most notably in the annihilation of Group Mobile 42 in 1950 and of GM 100 in 1954.

[28] Caltrops, mines and the steep cliff faces naturally found at the road side aided in funneling the target convoy into a small area, where machine guns, mortars and recoilless rifles were trained.

[4] By early summer 1953, thanks in part to the wind-down of hostilities in the Korean War, the French command had "sufficient reserves" at hand to begin clearing the Viet Minh back from Route One.

Proceeding into the dunes, the vehicles of 3rd Amphibious became stuck in the sand; in the meantime, other regular infantry elements of Group A were experiencing more difficulties in the sea, taking two extra hours to reach the beach.

Thus unsupported, elements of 3rd Amphibious that either disembarked floundering vehicles or were pushed, managed to escape the dunes and advance between Tân An and Mỹ Thủy.

In contrast, the crab had difficulty in water and its large size presented too great a target on land; however, it was lighter and more maneuverable,[38] except in paddy fields where its suspension became clogged with vegetation.

A minor fire-fight had taken place on the southern edge of Group B's advance when an Algerian company exchanged fire with 20–30 Viet Minh and suffered the first French fatalities.

[39] Group D, finally, was tasked with advancing south from its landing point to close off an escape route that ran between the sea and an inland lagoon towards the city of Hué.

Landing at 04:30, the group made quick progress through the beach and dunes, secured the small city of Thé Chi Dong and hit the north coast of the lagoon by 05:30, thereby sealing off that escape route with no enemy contact.

The final act of sealing the noose was to move some of the French Navy vessels north to the Vietnamese villages of Ba-Lang and An-Hoi where any attempt by Regiment 95 to flee by sea would have taken place.

[41] Leblanc had realized the intentions of Regiment 95's commander, and had requested one of the two reserve paratroop units to be deployed at the border between the network of temples and the dune-filled area in front of where Group D had originally landed.

[43] The 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Chasseurs Regiment[24][42] had been requested to drop at 14:00 to support the advanced elements of Group C but did not jump until 16:50 and thus failed to assemble before the Moroccans themselves occupied Phu-An.

Crabs and alligators were stationed on, or in some cases in, the canal network, and French infantry were scattered across the edge of the pocket throughout that night in order to detect escaping Viet Minh.

[46] On the morning of 29 July 1953, the French forces continued to advance into the remaining 23-square-kilometer (9 sq mi) pocket, encountering neither Viet Minh nor civilian.

[47] At this time, however, a Morane aircraft detected the movement of elements of Regiment 95 towards An-Hoi on the extreme northern corner of the operational area, outside of the pocket.

[47] The French then undertook a methodical house-to-house search of the entire area, sweeping each village, and the surrounding paddy fields and jungle, risking encounter with Viet Minh caltrops.

This involved the rebuilding of road and rail links (Vietnam's North–South railway ran alongside Route One),[31] the repairing of infrastructure, demining, the installation of new Vietnamese government administrators,[48] and the provision of "everything from rice to anti-malaria tablets".

Important stocks of paddy were found, but the number of arms captured was not as great as expected; it is thought that: the Viet Minh soldiers, on finding themselves surrounded, threw their weapons into the rice fields and swamps.

[53] Fall goes on to record that the "major defect" of Operation Camargue was that the French had nothing like the numerical superiority to encircle a force in the terrain around Road One, 15:1 as opposed to the 20:1 or 25:1 that he believed required.