The aim of the massive search-and-destroy operation was to eradicate the Iron Triangle, an area northwest of Saigon that had become a major stronghold of the Viet Cong (VC).

Moreover, critics argue that the harsh treatment of the civilian population was both morally questionable and detrimental to the US effort to win Vietnamese hearts and minds and drove many into the ranks of the VC instead.

The planning for Operation Cedar Falls evolved out of the broader strategic aims which MACV, the United States' unified command structure for its military forces in South Vietnam, had formulated for 1967.

Following the war's earlier stages, in which the insertion of major US ground troops had averted the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime and during which the Americans had built up their forces, COMUSMACV General William C. Westmoreland planned to go on the offensive during 1967.

[5] Ben Suc was described by Jonathan Schell as an important marketplace town for the region with a population of 3500, and a refuge point for people fleeing from continual combat operations and US/ARVN aerial and artillery nearby.

[7]: 19 American intelligence indicated that the VC's Military Region IV headquarters were located in the Iron Triangle; their destruction thus was a principal aim of Operation Cedar Falls.

Throughout the operation these units were supposed to bear the brunt of the fighting; South Vietnamese troops were planned to search villages in the region, perform logistical tasks, as well as organizing the deportation of the civilian population.

Indeed, the reason why the VC were able to establish the Iron Triangle as a major sanctuary was that its terrain made it difficult for larger military forces to access this region.

The remaining units were then supposed to "hammer" the VC against this "anvil" by rapidly moving through the Iron Triangle, scouring it for enemy troops and installations, and clearing it of civilians.

These operations were to be succeeded by the completion of the area's encirclement as well as a concerted drive of American forces through the Iron Triangle (the "hammer") from both the south and the west in phase II.

Those South Vietnamese officials, who were charged with the relocation of the villagers, were not informed of their task to organize a refugee camp until 24 hours before the forced evacuation began.

Perhaps forewarned or anticipating the attack, the VC had chosen to evade allied forces by either fleeing across the border into Cambodia or hiding in complex underground systems.

Allied troops were overwhelmingly engaged in extensive searches and patrolling during daytime and ambushing during the night; casualties were suffered primarily from sniper fire, land mines, and booby traps.

In order to infiltrate these vast underground complexes, the US military used specifically trained teams (so-called "tunnel rats") for the first time in the war.

The American military claimed that in its course almost 750 VC were killed, 280 were taken prisoner, and 540 defected in the Chieu Hoi ("open-arms") program; an additional 512 suspects were detained and almost 6,000 individuals were deported.

Finally, in order to deny the VC cover and make future penetrations of the area simpler, eleven square kilometers of jungle were cleared.

[12] Whether these casualty figures were solely enemy combatants during this operation is questioned by first-hand observer and embedded journalist Jonathan Schell, writing for The New Yorker.

"[7]: 77  General William DePuy, then commander of the 1st Infantry Division, noted a "complete breakdown in confidence and morale on the part of the VC" and called Cedar Falls a "decisive turning point in the III Corps area; a tremendous boost of morale of the Vietnamese Government and Army; and a blow from which the VC in this area may never recover.

While he concedes that Cedar Falls missed some of its short-term goals, he holds that, along with its follow-up Operation Junction City, it had beneficial long term strategic consequences: It dealt a serious blow to the North Vietnamese strategy of protracted guerilla warfare by permanently driving the VC's main force from the more populated areas and across the Cambodian border.

Instead of driving the VC into a more "vulnerable posture", as had been intended by MACV, they were in fact driven into Cambodia and hence into a region beyond the allied forces' reach where, together with the North Vietnamese Army, they established sanctuaries immune to US attacks.

They argue that, for all its impressive statistics, Operation Cedar Falls failed to achieve its primary goal: Whereas it did deal a serious blow to the VC, communist forces swiftly reestablished their dominant position in the Iron Triangle.

Moreover, the saturation bombing and artillery fire as well as the forced deportation of 6,000 civilians are considered tactics which, in addition to being morally highly questionable, were militarily counterproductive as well.

While writing from completely different, if not opposed, political points of view, both journalist Stanley Karnow and political scientist Guenter Lewy cite the deportations of Operation Cedar Falls as an example of a larger military strategy which deliberately displaced hundreds of thousands of the very people the US claimed to defend and thus alienated them from the South Vietnamese regime and their American allies.