The objective of the offensive was to re-establish a road link between the city of Banja Luka in the west of the country and the eastern parts of the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.

In the second phase of the offensive, the VRS reached the Sava River, the border with Croatia, and destroyed a bridgehead held by the HV and the HVO at Bosanski Brod.

The Croatian National Defence Council commissioned a report into the loss of Bosanska Posavina and blamed internal conflicts, a double chain of command and ineffective counterintelligence for the defeat.

The outcome later caused speculation that it was the result of a political arrangement between Serb and Croatian leaders to secure a land trade, though a Central Intelligence Agency analysis rejected such allegations.

In the final days of March, Bosnian Serb forces bombarded Bosanski Brod with artillery, drawing a border crossing by the HV 108th Brigade in response.

[3] The JNA and the VRS in Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine – ARBiH) and the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane – HVO), reporting to the Bosniak-dominated central government and the Bosnian Croat leadership respectively, as well as the HV, which occasionally supported HVO operations.

[2] A UN arms embargo introduced in September 1991, had hampered the preparation of the various forces,[4] but in late April, the VRS was able to deploy 200,000 troops, along with hundreds of tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and artillery pieces, while the HVO and the Croatian Defence Forces (Hrvatske obrambene snage – HOS) could field approximately 25,000 soldiers and a handful of heavy weapons.

However, the political situation in the region, especially by the end of 1991, was marked with obstructions by the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) that established parallel authorities.

The capture of Derventa also severed the last road available to the Bosnian Serbs spanning VRS-controlled western Bosnia around Banja Luka and the VRS-held territory in the east of the country, adjacent to Serbia.

[17] The deaths of twelve newborn babies in Banja Luka hospital due to a shortage of incubator bottled oxygen were cited as an immediate cause for the action.

[27] As the presence of HV units was constantly objected by foreign observers, on 7 July 1992 the Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak issued an order that only volunteers could be deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It comprised VRS advances towards Derventa, Bosanski Brod and Odžak, aiming to reach the Sava and thereby the border with Croatia, north of the three towns.

The advance initially had moderate success, until 4 October when the VRS rebalanced its forces, changing the sector of the bridgehead against which the 1st Krajina Corps was concentrated.

In response, the HV and the HVO withdrew their troops and equipment in an orderly fashion,[17] and the bridge spanning the Sava between the town and Slavonski Brod was demolished on 7 October.

After some initial success, the VRS offensive failed and the HVO drove the attacking force back to the positions they had held prior to the advance.

A total of 11,651 artillery shells and fourteen 9K52 Luna-M rockets were fired against the city, and 130 bombs were dropped from the air, resulting in the deaths of 116 civilians,[33] including 27 children.

However, the commission concluded that there was no unified political and military objective in Bosanska Posavina and the defence was burdened by internal conflicts and accusations.

[36] According to former Croatian prime minister Josip Manolić the report "clearly indicated the responsibility of Gojko Šušak, and of his separate military and political lines [of command] on the ground, for the fall of Posavina.

[39] Stipetić's view regarding the Graz agreement is echoed by British historian Marko Attila Hoare, who claims that the area conceded by the Croats during Operation Corridor 92 was traded for western Herzegovina.

[40] While some sources have proposed that the area was traded for the JNA-held Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik, a Central Intelligence Agency analysis concluded that there is no direct evidence of such arrangements.

He also pointed out that the HV and HVO suffered from ineffective command structures and poor intelligence, noting that they had failed to detect the presence of the VRS 16th Motorised and the 1st Armoured brigades early on.

The defendants, Blagoje Simić, Miroslav Tadić and Simo Zarić, were charged with unlawful arrest, detention, beatings, torture, forced labour, deportation and forcible transfer.