Additionally, the air strikes flown during Deny Flight led to Operation Deliberate Force, a massive NATO bombing campaign in Bosnia that played a key role in ending the war.

The US had already taken unilateral actions to aid civilians caught in the conflict by dropping humanitarian supplies into Bosnia under Operation Provide Promise, and many US officials argued for the use of military force.

[3] After its adoption, Operation Deny Flight was relatively successful in preventing fixed-wing aircraft from flying over restricted air space in Bosnia.

The questionable identity of these helicopters became particularly problematic after the Black Hawk Incident in Iraq, because NATO pilots became more reluctant to engage potential belligerents without clear identification.

UN approval required contact with the United Nations headquarters in New York City, making effective coordination nearly impossible given the difference in time zones.

[15] Even after this simplification, however, "dual key" remained a problem as all requests first had to be processed through the UN Air Operations Center in Kiseljak then pass up the entire UNPROFOR chain of command to Akashi.

[32] Eight days later, on 8 March, a CASA C-212 transport plane was hit by a missile near the border between Croatia and the Republic of Krajina, while ferrying UNPROFOR personnel from Zagreb to Split.

Initially, US Secretary of Defense William Perry told reporters that the United States would "not enter the war to stop" the Serbs from overrunning Goražde, and other senior officials publicly downplayed the possibility of using air strikes.

[37] Some of the UNPROFOR hostages were from NATO member states, notably the United Kingdom and France, who pushed for an immediate end to the strikes out of fear for the safety of their personnel.

[40] On 22 September, UNPROFOR again requested NATO air support in the Sarajevo area after Serb forces attacked a French armored personnel carrier.

[41] NATO immediately looked for ways to respond, but its forces were not permitted to carry out operations in Croatian airspace, and due to Bihać's proximity to the border, Serb aircraft could attack into Bosnia, then cross back into Croatia before being intercepted.

The strike, which involved 39 aircraft, was the largest combat operation in NATO's history up to that time;[14] nonetheless, it was criticized as a "pinprick" that did little real damage to Serb capabilities, only temporarily disabling runways.

[45] After the strikes at Otoka and Dvor, Bosnian Serb forces continued to target NATO aircraft with surface-to-air missiles, while advancing against the Bihać enclave.

[47] On 17 December, however, another French Navy Super Etendard was hit by a missile over Bosnia while on a recce mission, and had to perform an emergency landing on an airbase in Italy.

[5] Nonetheless, the reduced tensions resulting from the Carter ceasefire and the cessation of NATO active air operations led to the release of most of the UNPROFOR hostages over the next several weeks.

By late December, the planners developed a plan called "Dead Eye", designed to eliminate Serb SAM capabilities, so that NATO could regain uncontested air superiority.

More importantly, Gen. Rose established the UN Rapid Reaction Force, a heavily armed unit with more aggressive rules of engagement, designed to take offensive action if necessary to prevent hostage-taking and enforce peace agreements.

Dutch peacekeepers in the area considered calling for NATO air strikes in response to the attack, but they decided against them because the Serbs were not using heavy weapons, and out of fear of another hostage crisis.

[65] By the end of the day, Srebrenica had fallen to Bosnian Serb forces, who began a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing that left roughly 8,000 men dead.

As a result of the conference, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave General Bernard Janvier, the UN military commander, the authority to request NATO airstrikes without consulting civilian UN officials.

[75] In practice, most tactical level decisions about Deny Flight were made by the director of the CAOC, and he had the authority to order NATO pilots to engage violators of the no-fly zone.

[15] Within the United States, the US Navy and US Marine Corps provided the most support for the operation, and together they flew 70% of all of the air defense sorties flown during Deny Flight.

As such, Deny Flight "represented a momentous act, if only in symbolic terms, in that the alliance assumed a combat mission in a nondefensive capacity and out-of-area".

In particular, the Royal Navy added the Paveway II laser-guided bomb to the Harrier, giving it a precision capability, and upgraded electronics aboard the aircraft in response to the necessities of combat in Bosnia.

[21] Deny Flight also demonstrated the necessity of better communications and integration among forces operating together, and led to some calls for technical training of UN personnel to work with NATO military systems.

Deny Flight and other early operations "forced the Allies to consider the question of NATO's military responsibility for territory outside of its traditional defense perimeter, and it was one over which they were deeply divided".

Admiral Leighton Smith, the commander of NATO's forces during Deny Flight, expressed this sentiment quite bluntly, saying "Don't ever have another dual key.

According to Robert E. Hunter, then the US Ambassador to NATO, Deny Flight was crucial to the process of building "consensus support for increasingly robust use of airpower over Bosnia", which eventually culminated in Operation Deliberate Force.

From the very beginning, according to Michael Beale, "the operation's implied objective was to demonstrate UN and NATO determination to stabilize the situation in Bosnia so that a peaceful settlement could be achieved".

Nonetheless, NATO's limited air strikes under Deny Flight "demonstrated its determination to protect United Nations personnel" and Bosnian civilians, according to Michael R. Gordon, chief military correspondent for The New York Times.