Operation Gyroscope
The system aimed to increase retention rates by boosting morale and unit cohesion with the added incentive of improving military family stability through keeping soldiers together for most of their careers.
[2] The individual replacement system thus required the Army to maintain excess manpower to compensate for soldiers in transit between stations and low retention rates.
The report blamed the system for reducing discipline in combat, which it argued was the cause of the perceived unsatisfactory conduct and even defection of some American prisoners of war in Korea.
"[1] Matthew Ridgway, the then Army Chief of Staff, was a strong believer in the importance of esprit de corps and the prewar traditional regimental culture, and thus opposed the individual replacement system.
[2] The benefits of unit rotation were generally supported, and the end of the Korean War in 1953 finally gave the army an opportunity to adjust the replacement system.
Such stability was anticipated to lead to increased unit cohesion and thus higher retention rates, decreasing the costs of training caused by the frequent personnel turnover and improving efficiency.
This was considered a success by the army, with the personnel and dependents in place at Darmstadt within a day of docking at Bremerhaven and boarding waiting trains, having been provided extensive assistance in settling in by sponsors from the 760th Field Artillery Battalion.
11th Airborne Division officer Robert Elton attested to such gains, with the discharge of "malcontents, misfits, and criminals" and their replacement with motivated trainees whom training instructors worked hard to prepare, "knowing that they might lead these same soldiers in combat."
[3] Although not initially envisaged under Gyroscope, the rotation of nondivisional combat support units such as field artillery, signals, engineering and transportation battalions and even companies was implemented in 1956.
The Pentomic reorganization broke up regiments in order to optimize the army for nuclear war, contradicting Gyroscope goals of building unit cohesion and tradition.
With contrasting imperatives and budget constraints, the Army leadership was forced to choose between a system that served its bureaucratic and organizational needs and one that theoretically benefited the individual soldier.
Such assessments relied on selective interpretation of data, exemplified by Taylor's claim in a 1956 speech that retention had jumped from 17 to nearly 60 percent, even though in this figure he counted those who enlisted to pursue reserve rather than active duty careers.
Meanwhile, 10th Infantry Division's married soldiers found out on short notice that a lack of dependent housing in Germany meant that they would have to either transfer or leave their families behind stateside.
Army requirements quickly forced a rethinking of promises to keep Gyroscope units at permanent stations, with the 10th Infantry Division told that they would not be coming back to Fort Riley after returning from Germany in three years.
