The Americans relied on massed firepower and mobility in big-unit search and destroy operations as part of a war of attrition which often resulted in heavy casualties on both sides.
Whereas the Australians, although not eschewing conventional operations, emphasised deliberate patrolling using dispersed companies supported by artillery, APCs and helicopters to separate the Viet Cong (VC) from the population in the villages, while slowly extending government control.
[2][3]: 171–2 Consequently, 1 ATF would be allocated its own Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) in Phước Tuy Province, thereby allowing them to pursue operations more independently using their own methods.
[5]: 136–7 Located 40 kilometres (25 mi) south-east of Saigon, Phước Tuy Province lay on the coast between the mountains of southern central Vietnam and the alluvial plains of the Mekong Delta, dominating the approaches to Vũng Tàu and the main highway to the capital.
Mostly flat, it gradually sloped north, while the Nui Thi Vai, Mây Tào and Long Hải mountains rose in the south-west, north-east and south.
[3]: 209–11 With just a quarter of the province used for agriculture, it supported a modest population of 104,636, most of which was concentrated in the south-west in approximately 30 villages and 100 hamlets, with major settlements at Bà Rịa, Long Điền, Đất Đỏ, Bình Gia and Xuyên Mộc.
[6]: 367 Rainforest, thick scrub and grassland covered almost three-quarters of the province, in places restricting movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles, limiting visibility to close range and providing extensive concealment.
[2]: 324 As a consequence, the local population had a long tradition of resistance to the former French colonial administration, while revolutionary elements later challenged repeated attempts by the ARVN to bring the province under control of the central government in Saigon.
This would allow the force greater freedom of action and the chance to demonstrate the Australian Army's evolving concept for counter-insurgency warfare, developed in part from its operations during the Malayan Emergency.
[8]: 39 Its principal objective was to secure Route 15 for military movement to ensure allied control of the port at Vũng Tàu, while politically it sought to extend government authority in Phước Tuy.
[3]: 196 Situated on Route 2, Nui Dat's central position offered short lines of communication, was close but not adjacent to the main population centres, and would allow 1 ATF to disrupt VC activity in the area.
[9]: 7 Astride a major transit and resupply route, it was close to a VC base area yet near enough to Bà Rịa to afford security to the provincial capital and facilitate liaison with the local authorities.
On 17 May While the 1/503rd established blocking positions around the village, ARVN forces moved in to sweep the area meeting strong resistance from a company from the VC D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion in an extensive tunnel and bunker system.
[1]: 178 Meanwhile, the decision to occupy Nui Dat rather than co-locate 1 ATF with its logistic support at Vũng Tàu allowed the task force to have a greater impact but resulted in additional manpower demands to secure the base.
[8]: 49 Jackson was uneasy about the possibility of a concentration against Nui Dat, fearing a major military and political setback if they succeeded in attacking 1 ATF soon after its arrival and caused heavy casualties.
[1]: 178 Although hampered by the monsoon, defensive positions were dug, command posts sandbagged, and living areas built, while claymore mines, concertina wire and other obstacles were laid, and the vegetation cleared out to small arms range.
[3]: 240–1 [8]: 57 Yet while adding to the physical security of the base, disrupting a major VC support area and removing the local population from danger,[3]: 241 such measures may have been counter-productive.
[8]: 57 Indeed, the resettlement resulted in widespread resentment and it was debatable how much information the inhabitants would provide on VC movements, potentially creating an opportunity to attack Nui Dat without warning.