Operation Hardnose

Operation Hardnose expanded and continued to report on the Ho Chi Minh trail even as American military intelligence activities mounted against the communist supply artery.

Having paid little attention to fostering local government during their colonization of Laos, the French left a nation woefully short of expertise and leadership.

[2] In Summer 1963, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case agent Mike Deuel shifted his base of operations from Nakhon Phanom, Thailand to Pakse, Laos.

After advanced training at Phitsanulok, Thailand, in Autumn 1963 the agents were assigned to road watch duties in the section of the Ho Chi Minh trail that ran through Military Region 4 of Laos.

Aided by Team T of the Police Aerial Resupply Unit, the Lao Theung spies were so successful that within two months, their efforts were being lauded by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

[6] By September, the Hardnose road watchers had reported 5,000 People's Army of Vietnam troops moving south along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The quickly growing transportation network included a new road in progress, Route 911, which would trim a third of the distance between the Mụ Giạ Pass and Tchepone.

[7] In September 1964, the Southeast Asia Coordination Meeting—a monthly session of U.S. ambassadors, CIA officials, and Department of Defense higherups—decided that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam should be running its own patrols into Operation Hardnose territory.

[9] By September 1965, MACV-SOG had overcome Sullivan's misgivings concerning Lao neutrality, and had Operation Shining Brass patrols probing the Ho Chi Minh trail from South Vietnam.

In late October, a team of 21 Royal Thai Special Forces (RTSF) instructors had joined Hardnose at their newly opened base 27 kilometers (17 mi) southeast of Houei Kong.

In February 1966, three unmarked Operation Pony Express CH-3C helicopters were supplied to replace Air America in aerial transport of the Hardnose and Star teams.

In early 1967, the CIA's Technical Services Division forwarded a magnetic traffic sensor to be placed on the trail; however, it failed to keep accurate count or quit entirely.

The Hark-1 trainer who appeared in February found a troubled situation; the Thais were wrapped up in their Operation Star to the neglect of the CIA's road watch program.

This mismatch in numbers, combined with a sensor surveillance program begun in late 1967, cast doubt on the accuracy of the road watch teams.

A new military intelligence processing center called Task Force Alpha opened at Nakhon Phanom to collate all sources of information from the trail.