1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Operation Harpoon was one of two simultaneous Allied convoys sent to supply Malta in the Axis-dominated central Mediterranean Sea in mid-June 1942, during the Second World War.

In the following 48 hours, all the merchant ships were sunk off Malta or destroyed inside the port; barely 5,000 long tons (5,100 t) of supplies were unloaded.

The island continued to function as a staging post but the Axis bombing campaign neutralised Malta as an offensive base.

By the end of February, 11 ships had crossed without escort and a blackout caused by a change to the C 38m machine, in early March, made little difference to the British for lack of means.

If Martuba or Benghazi in Cyrenaica had been captured by the Eighth Army, a westbound convoy from Alexandria might survive without cover from battleships and aircraft carriers.

It would also be known if Luftwaffe aircraft had been diverted to the Russian Front and if the crisis in the Indian Ocean had abated, sufficient for ships to escort a fast convoy from Alexandria.

[6] Operation Hercules (Operazione C3) was an Axis plan to invade Malta and during 1942, reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in Sicily and the bombing campaign against the island led to speculation that it was the prelude to invasion.

The absence of evidence from signals intelligence and air reconnaissance led to a conclusion that an invasion was not imminent but the need to protect the source of information meant that this was not disclosed by the British.

That preparations were being made were revealed on 7 February through the decryption of Luftwaffe Enigma messages but by 23 March the invasion scare had died down and more bombing was expected.

[7] Hitler was lukewarm about the operation, in case the Italian navy let down the Fallschirmjäger (parachute and glider troops) but the Axis capture of Tobruk in mid-June made it appear that an invasion was redundant.

Hitler and Mussolini agreed to Panzerarmee Afrika pursuing the British into Egypt for the rest of June and into July, which meant cancelling Hercules.

[8] After the success of Operation Crusader (18 November – 30 December 1941), the Eighth Army advanced 800 km (500 mi) westwards to El Agheila in Libya, capturing airfields and landing grounds to provide air cover for Malta convoys.

By 6 February, the British had been defeated, forced to retreat east of the Jebel Akhdar back to the Gazala line just west of Tobruk, where the Panzerarmee had begun its retirement seven weeks earlier.

The Allied Operation Julius began on the same day as the Afrika Korps broke out and by 14 June, forced the British to retreat towards Tobruk.

[10] Two weeks before the convoys, the carrier HMS Eagle began operations to deliver 63 Spitfires to Malta, which increased the number to 95 serviceable fighters.

[14] Convoy MW4 left Gibraltar on 12 June 1942, with six merchantmen (the British Troilus, Burdwan and Orari, the Dutch Tanimbar, the American Chant and the tanker Kentucky) carrying 43,000 short tons (39,000 t) of cargo and oil.

At dawn an Italian aircraft spotted the convoy 50 nmi (58 mi; 93 km) north of Cape Bougaroni, about halfway between Algiers and Bizerte.

[19] The fast minelayer Welshman was detached and travelled to Malta alone, delivered ammunition, then sailed back next day to rejoin the convoy escorts.

[20] At dawn on 15 June, near Pantelleria, the lightly defended convoy was subjected to a coordinated attack by Axis aircraft and the Italian 7th Cruiser Division (Ammiraglio di divisione [Vice-Admiral] Alberto da Zara), Raimondo Montecuccoli, Eugenio di Savoia and the destroyers Ascari, Alfredo Oriani, Lanzerotto Malocello, Premuda and Ugolino Vivaldi.

[27] While scaring off the small escorting vessels of the crippled ships and according to post-battle reports from both sides, Raimondo Montecuccoli hit the minesweeper HMS Hebe at "approx.

[35] Captain Hardy reported, During the final day of Harpoon three merchant ships in convoy were lost due to enemy air action.

But for the enemy surface force, both of these ships might have been brought in.In 1960, Ian Playfair, the British official historian, wrote that the relationship of the "battle for supplies" with the land war reached a climax in the second half of 1942.

Vigorous had been a "disappointing operation" and turned back because the British and US air attacks on the Italian battle fleet had failed to inflict the damage hoped for.

Part of the convoy did get through to Malta, but the British suffered far heavier losses than did the Italians....[40]In 2001, Giorgio Giorgerini wrote that the Battle of Pantelleria was not a strategic success because two merchantmen reached Malta but was a satisfying tactical success; one of the few instances in which Italian warships fought aggressively enough against their opponents, even though somewhat exaggerated beyond its merits in later writing.

[42] In 2003, Richard Woodman wrote that on 16 June, Harwood reported that, We are outnumbered both in surface ships and Air Force and very gallant endeavour of all concerned cannot make up for...the deficiency.

The ten most injured survivors of Bedouin were picked up by a CANT Z.506 Airone (Heron) seaplane after a Luftwaffe aircraft had spotted them and dropped a flare.