The strike on al-Shifa proved controversial; after the attacks, the U.S. evidence and rationale were criticized as faulty, and academics Max Taylor and Mohamed Elbushra cite "a broad acceptance that this plant was not involved in the production of any chemical weapons.

Deploring the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the alleged U.S. aim to fragment Iraq, and U.S. support for Israel, they declared that "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.

From February to June 1998, al-Qaeda prepared to launch their attacks, renting residences, building their bombs, and acquiring trucks; meanwhile, bin Laden continued his public-relations efforts, giving interviews with ABC News and Pakistani journalists.

[22][23] Bin Laden justified the high-casualty attacks, the largest against the U.S. since the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings,[24] by claiming they were in retaliation for the deployment of U.S. troops in Somalia; he also alleged that the embassies had devised the Rwandan genocide as well as a supposed plan to partition Sudan.

[35] Using helicopters or bombers would have been difficult due to the lack of a suitable base or Pakistani permission to cross its airspace, and the administration also feared a recurrence of the disastrous 1980 Operation Eagle Claw in Iran.

[40] The Khost complex, which was 90 miles (140 km) southeast of Kabul,[41] also had ideological significance: Bin Laden had fought nearby during the Soviet–Afghan War, and he had given interviews and even held a press conference at the site.

[49] The Clinton administration justified Operation Infinite Reach under Article 51 of the UN Charter and Title 22, Section 2377 of the U.S. Code; the former guarantees a UN member state's right to self-defense, while the latter authorizes presidential action by "all necessary means" to target international terrorist infrastructure.

[54] In Islamabad on the evening of August 20, Ralston informed Pakistan Army Chief of Staff Jehangir Karamat of the incoming American strikes ten minutes before the missiles entered Pakistani airspace.

[34] Clarke stated that intelligence linked bin Laden to Al-Shifa's current and past operators, namely Iraqi nerve gas experts such as Emad al-Ani[63] and Sudan's ruling National Islamic Front.

[68] With the help of an Egyptian agent, the CIA had obtained a sample of soil from the facility taken in December 1997[f] showing the presence of O-Ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid (EMPTA), a substance used in the production of VX nerve gas, at 2.5 times trace levels.

[76][77][78] The $30 million[79] Al-Shifa factory, which had a $199,000 contract with the UN under the Oil-for-Food Programme,[80] employed 300 Sudanese and provided over half of the country's pharmaceuticals, including medicines for malaria, diabetes, gonorrhea, and tuberculosis.

[85] Sudan requested a UN investigation of the Al-Shifa plant to verify or disprove the allegations of weapons production; while the proposal was backed by several international organizations, it was opposed by the U.S.[86] The American Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) criticized the CIA's intelligence on Al-Shifa and bin Laden in an August 6 memo; as James Risen reported, INR analysts concluded that "the evidence linking Al Shifa to bin Laden and chemical weapons was weak.

"[65] According to Risen, some dissenting officials doubted the basis for the strike, but senior principals believed that "the risks of hitting the wrong target were far outweighed by the possibility that the plant was making chemical weapons for a terrorist eager to use them.

[73] According to CIA officer Paul R. Pillar, senior Agency officials met with Tenet before he briefed the White House on bin Laden and Al-Shifa, and the majority of them opposed attacking the plant.

[91] Ultimately, Barletta concludes that "It remains possible that Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory may have been involved in some way in producing or storing the chemical compound EMPTA ... On balance, the evidence available to date indicates that it is more probable that the Shifa plant had no role whatsoever in CW production.

[102][103] The U.S. first fired unitary (C-model) Tomahawks at the Khost camps, aiming to attract militants into the open, then launched a barrage of D-model missiles equipped with submunitions to maximize casualties.

"[115] One 1998 U.S. News & World Report article suggested that most of the strike's victims were Pakistani militants bound for the Kashmiri insurgency, rather than al-Qaeda members;[116] the operation killed a number of ISI officers present in the camps.

[36][125] Other U.S. officials reject the tip-off theory, citing a lack of evidence and ISI casualties in the strike; Tenet later wrote in his memoirs that the CIA could not ascertain whether Bin Laden had been warned in advance.

[36][128] Scheuer charges that while the U.S. had planned to target the complex's mosque during evening prayers to kill bin Laden and his associates, the White House allegedly delayed the strikes "to avoid offending the Muslim world".

[130] Clinton flew back to Washington, D.C. from his vacation at Martha's Vineyard, speaking with legislators from Air Force One and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Sharif from the White House.

[139] While U.S. allies such as Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, and the Northern Alliance[142] supported the attacks, they were opposed by Cuba, Russia, and China, as well as the targeted nations and other Muslim countries.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that "resolute actions by all countries" were required against terrorism, while Russian President Boris Yeltsin condemned "the ineffective approach to resolving disputes without trying all forms of negotiation and diplomacy.

[154] Harkat-ul-Mujahideen threatened Americans and Jews, announcing a worldwide jihad against the U.S. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya denounced the strikes as "a crime which will not go without punishment" and encouraged fellow militant groups to reciprocate.

[99] Children in Kenya and Tanzania wore bin Laden T-shirts,[111] and al-Qaeda sold propaganda videos of the strikes' damage in European and Middle Eastern Islamic bookstores.

[159] A 1999 report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories stated that bin Laden "appeared to many as an underdog standing firm in the face of bullying aggression," adding that the missile strikes sparked further planning of attacks by extremists.

[164] Russian intelligence and intercepted al-Qaeda communications indicate that China sent officials to Khost to examine and buy some of the unexploded missiles;[104] bin Laden used the over $10 million in proceeds to fund Chechen opposition forces.

"[111] The September 9 State Department cable also claimed that "the U.S. strikes have flushed the Arab and Pakistani militants out of Khost,"[108] and while the camps were relocated near Kandahar and Kabul, paranoia lingered as al-Qaeda suspected that a traitor had facilitated the attacks.

"[34] Zawahiri made a phone call to reporter Rahimullah Yusufzai, stating that "We survived the attack ... we aren't afraid of bombardment, threats, and acts of aggression ... we are ready for more sacrifices.

[181] The U.S. considered firing more cruise missiles against bin Laden in Kandahar in December 1998 and May 1999; at an Emirati hunting camp in Helmand in February 1999; and in Ghazni in July 1999, but the strikes were called off due to various factors, including questionable intelligence and the potential for collateral damage.

[182] Similarly, CIA-employed Afghans planned six times to attack bin Laden's convoy but did not, citing fears of civilian casualties, tight security, or that the al-Qaeda chief took a different route.