On August 4, 1998, joint Rwandan and Ugandan forces launched a surprise attack on Kitona airbase in Western Congo using hijacked civilian airliners.

In turn, Kabila appointed many Rwandans as key officials in his new government and armed forces; including James Kabarebe who served as the Congolese army Chief of Staff.

By late 1997 the Congolese population was growing weary of the Rwandan Patriotic Army, which fought anti-Rwandan insurgencies in the eastern Congo with considerable brutality, smuggled natural resources out of the country, confiscated land and dwellings, and disrespected civilians.

[citation needed] These actions angered many in the Rwandan government, as it posed a threat to their influence in the Congo as well as the safety of Tutsis in both the DRC and Rwanda.

[2][3][4] Paul Kagame, Rwandan Minister of Defence, concerned of these outcomes for months, had begun drawing up plans for a second military intervention in the Congo in April 1998.

[6] Kabarebe's experience in the Congo convinced him that various local dissidents, from interned Banyamulenge to ex-FAZ soldiers, would join the Rwandans and help swiftly depose the Kabila government.

On the evening of August 2 in Goma, FAC General Sylvain Mbuki and his deputy went to the local Rwandan-controlled Radio-Télévision Nationale Congolaise station.

While this message was broadcast, commandos from the Rwandan High Command Unit (HCU) moved into the city seized Goma International Airport as well as four civilian airliners and a number of lighter transports.

[3] The Kitona Air Base's airfield and main facilities were captured within 30 minutes,[8] and the remaining two 707s then landed and offloaded their troops and supplies.

Banyamulenge, Tutsis, political opponents, as well as ordinary citizens believed to be enemies were subject to property seizures, imprisonment, rape, torture, and summary execution.

Kabila continued his pleas for aid from South African Development Community, and on August 17 Zimbabwe and Namibia agreed to support his efforts to combat the various threats to his regime.

By August 17 the main Rwandan force had advanced as far as Kinsielele, 30 km (18 miles) south of Kinshasa, using country roads before running out of fuel.

[9] While this information was accurate with respect to many in the Angolan Army, José Eduardo dos Santos, the President of Angola, remained a friend of Kabila.

Instead of attacking along the Kasangulu road a third time, Kabarebe realized the Zimbabweans at N'Djili were both outnumbered and the only real support for the Kabila government, given the unreliable performance of the remaining FAC troops.

Zimbabwean Major-General Mike Nyambuya realized this and on August 25 deployed numerous SAS teams across the outskirts of Kinshasa with the aim of delaying the Rwandan advance.

[3] Due to the constant attack from the air and determined defense of the remainder of the airfield, the first Rwandan assault was unable to take any ground.

Eventually the Rwandans were dislodged and forced to retreat to the Kimbanseke and Masina neighborhoods where they had prepared trenches and other defensive works throughout the previous few days.

Two days of trench warfare ensued until August 30, when Kabarebe and the remaining Rwandan and Ugandan troops abandoned the FAC mutineers, and fled south into the Jungle.

September 1, Angolan troops with support from Zimbabwean SAS commandos finally recaptured the Inga Dams, whose Ugandan defenders slipped away to rendezvous with the remaining Rwandan attack force.

[3][6] The Rwandan troops took time to regain strength and in mid-September launched an attack on the airfield with the assistance of local UNITA insurgents, quickly taking control of it.

[11] The operation is also studied at military colleges throughout the world for its innovative use of airborne infantry, and for its intelligence failures; chiefly the Rwandans' mistaken belief that Angola would not support Kabila's government.