In Operation Mars, which was planned to start in late October, forces of the Kalinin and the Western Fronts would encircle and destroy the powerful German Ninth Army in the Rzhev salient.

The basic plan of the offensive was to launch multiple co-ordinated thrusts from all sides of the salient, resulting in the destruction of the Ninth Army.

In some cases, German strongpoints remained manned for a time after the Soviets advanced past them, creating more problems for the Red Army in their rear areas.

One part of a small wood... had been a battlefield; the trees blasted by shells and mines looked like stakes driven in at random.

The minor penetrations and the resulting small bridgeheads made it difficult to bring forward reinforcements and follow-up forces, especially artillery so critical for reducing the German strongpoints.

With limited reserves and reinforcement unlikely due to Soviet offensives elsewhere, the Ninth Army was put under great pressure.

The Germans were able to hit the flank of the Kalinin Front and trapped Major General MD Solomatin's Mechanized Corps for three days before they were relieved.

However, in the aftermath of Operation Mars the commander of Army Group Centre, Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge, recommended the Germans abandon the salient to economize on manpower and to assume more defensible positions.

In addition, he was unwilling to give up any ground he had won and saw usefulness in retaining the salient as a starting point for a future thrust upon Moscow.

However, in the spring of 1943, his desire to move back onto the offensive made him more receptive to withdrawing forces from the salient to free up manpower for operations elsewhere.

In the plan for the large offensive at Kursk in July 1943, the German Ninth Army was positioned in the southern area of the Orel salient.

"[13] In addition, the Russian historian Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, citing Stavka orders, asserted that the goal of Operation Mars was to tie down German forces in the Rzhev sector, preventing them from reinforcing Stalingrad.

[14] According to NKVD agent Pavel Anatoliyevich Sudoplatov, Soviet intelligence intentionally leaked the plan of Operation Mars to the Germans as part of a series of deceptive "radio games" named "Monastery" (Монастырь).

[15][16][17][18] Zhukov concluded that the main reason Soviet forces were unable to destroy the Rzhev salient "was underestimation of the rugged terrain" and "the shortage of supporting armour, artillery, mortars, and aircraft to pierce the enemy defences."