[11] Between August 1991 and February 1992, the RSK initiated an ethnic cleansing campaign to drive out the Croat and non-Serb population from RSK-held territory,[12] eventually expelling as many as 250,000 people according to Human Rights Watch.

A ceasefire was agreed in the January 1992 Sarajevo Agreement and a United Nations peacekeeping force UNPROFOR was installed to police the armistice lines and act as negotiators, aid-workers, and combat soldiers.

It was fairly lightly inhabited before the attack, with about 400 Serb civilians residing in the area[16][better source needed] and was held by units of the SVK's 15th Lika Corps.

Bobetko therefore decided to run a small-scale tactical operation, with tasks of partially neutralizing Serb artillery positions around city of Gospić, destroying enemy recon-sabotage group base in Divoselo and shorten the length of Croatian frontline.

[citation needed] In accordance with their defense strategy called "Strategy of Real Threat", which envisioned deterring any Croatian attack of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina by bombarding Croatian cities in retribution,[26] Serb forces began to use long-range artillery (including FROG-7 ballistic missiles and M-87 Orkan) to bombard Karlovac, the Zagreb suburb of Lučko, Samobor and Jastrebarsko on 10 September.

[27] On 13 and 14 September, Croatian Air Force MiGs-21 successfully destroyed[28] some of the SVK artillery and rocket batteries on Banovina and Kordun but one of the aircraft was downed by SA-6 near Gvozd.

Notably, a month before, "Citizens and fighters of Divoselo" complained to their commanding officer that village defence is basically consisted of 30 people, out of which the youngest was aged 15 and oldest 72.

[32] The offensive attracted strong international criticism and, facing political and military pressure at home and from abroad, the Croatian government agreed to a ceasefire.

The attached Heavy Weapons Support Company brought 81 mm mortars and a specially fitted APC armed with anti-tank guided missiles.

[40] The actions of Major Mark Nicholas Gray of the Royal Marines, deployed with UNPROFOR, prevented total collapse of the dam as he had opened the spillway channel before the explosion and reduced the water level in the lake by 4 metres (13 ft).

[citation needed] The UN forces took control of abandoned Serbian positions but again came under fire from the Croatian lines, with the attackers using rocket propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns.

The Croatian side interpreted this Canadian move as their non-completing of first phase of the agreement, which among other things included demilitarisation of area around Serb-held positions.

[46] At the same time, Serb forces located to the rear of the Canadians sniped Croatian positions; nevertheless, the order was issued not to open fire on UNPROFOR.

As the night fell the situation became unclear because Serb troops could not be clearly distinct from UNPROFOR forces, so gunfire was exchanged with the opposing side as a mean of deterrent for any kind of attack on Croatian positions.

[44] The Croatian high command, realizing they had a public relations disaster on their hands, quickly moved back to their lines held on 9 September.

In his study "Human Losses in Operation Medak Pocket", author Miroslav Međimorec claims that he did a search of the entire Croatian Radio Television's archive, but was unable to find the alleged footage or any source of that number.

[46] Several cases were also recorded of Canadians entering 1.5–2 kilometers too deep behind the agreed lines and crushing Croatian road obstacles using their vehicles.

[65] In an interview with three CANBAT soldiers they explain that they arrived 48 hours ago and that their task was to observe the area and take up a position on the earth embankment fifty metres from where they had first come in between the opposing sides.

[67] Retired Croatian admiral Davor Domazet-Lošo, testifying at 2007 trial of general Mirko Norac, commanding officer of the 9th Guards Brigade in September 1993, and general Rahim Ademi, commanding officer of the Gospić military district at the time, denied Canadian claims of scale of the armed conflict with UNPROFOR and 26 Croatian fatalities resulting from the battle.

[citation needed] Domazet also invited Canadian side to show where are the graves of 26 Croatian soldiers "that they killed in non existing clash for which they received 800 medals".

[69] Croatian author Miroslav Međimorec gained access to the battle reports of ARSK 3rd Motorised Brigade (3. mtb), which was stationed near the Canadian UNPROFOR forces on 16 and 17 September 1993.

[70] Retired Royal Danish Army colonel Vagn Ove Moebjerg Nielsen, UNPROFOR commanding officer in the area at the time, but who was not present for the battle nor its aftermath, nor even in the area, testifying at the Ademi–Norac trial, denied that there was any armed conflict between the Canadian and Croatian troops except for a single incident when the Canadians deployed in front of Serb-held positions.

[72][73] The Medak Pocket was an event that challenged the skill and discipline of an army that had not deployed formed units to fight in a full-scale battle for almost 40 years.

The UN forces found that (in the words of an official Canadian study on the incident) "each and every building in the Medak Pocket had been leveled to the ground", in a total of eleven villages and hamlets.

[47] Investigators from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) determined that at least 100 Serbs had been unlawfully killed and many others had suffered serious injuries; many of the victims were women and elderly people.

[81] The trial of Mirko Norac and Rahim Ademi began at the Zagreb County Court in June 2007 and resulted in first-degree verdict in May 2008 whereby Norac was found guilty and given a seven-year sentence for failing to stop his soldiers killing Serbs (28 civilians and 5 prisoners), while Ademi was acquitted[49] on the grounds that, there was a parallel chain of command ran by Domazet Lošo.

[83][84][85] Former members of Croatian 9th Guards Brigade Velibor Šolaja[86] and Josip Krmpotić[87] were also found guilty of war crimes in the Medak Pocket.

[citation needed] The offensive also exposed serious weaknesses in the Croatian Army's command, control, and communications, which had also been a problem in Operation Maslenica earlier in the year.

The well-publicised accusations of war crimes, along with the Muslim-Croat bloodshed in Bosnia, led to Croatia's image being severely tarnished; in many quarters abroad, the country was viewed as having moved from being a victim to an aggressor.

[92][failed verification][93][neutrality is disputed] The war crimes committed during the operation damaged the credibility of UNPROFOR as well, as its forces had been unable to prevent them despite being in the vicinity at the time.