This page is subject to the extended confirmed restriction related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.Operation Mole Cricket 19 (Hebrew: מבצע ערצב-19, romanized: Mivtza ʻArtzav Tsha-Esreh) was a suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) campaign launched by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) against Syrian targets on June 9, 1982, at the outset of the 1982 Lebanon War.

The operation was the first time in history that a Western-equipped air force successfully destroyed a Soviet-built surface-to-air missile (SAM) network.

By the end of the day, the IAF had destroyed 29 of 30 SAM batteries deployed in the Beqaa Valley, and shot down 82–86 enemy aircraft, with minimal losses of its own.

Operation Model 5, a hastily-executed IAF attempt to take out the SAM batteries near the Golan Heights early in the fighting was unsuccessful, with catastrophic results for the attacking force.

When Egypt tried to push beyond the range of its SAM batteries on October 14, it lost 28 aircraft while Israel won a significant land battle.

[8] The losses suffered by Israel in the 1973 war were so high that it indirectly spawned the United States stealth aircraft program, Project HAVE BLUE.

The U.S. estimated that without a solution to the SAM problem, even the United States would suffer depletion of its Air Force within two weeks of a conflict erupting between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

[9] On May 28, 1980, IAF guided missiles destroyed two armored cars carrying SA-9 batteries, manned by Libyan troops, near Sidon.

[10] The Israeli media declared that a solution to the SAM problem was found, but the IAF Commander, David Ivry, said that this assessment was premature, and that the SA-9 was not really significantly superior to its predecessors.

[11] On April 28, 1981 the IAF (F-16A fighters from 117 Squadron at Ramat David air base) shot down two Syrian helicopters over Lebanon.

[8] Meanwhile, the United States was concerned that Soviet reaction to an Israeli strike might lead to a crisis between the superpowers, and pressured Begin not to attack.

On December 20, the Cabinet of Israel convened for a weekly meeting, in which Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and the Chief of Staff (Ramatkal) Rafael Eitan presented the "Big Plan" for an invasion of Lebanon, which included seizure of the Beirut-Damascus Highway.

We desire no clashes with the Syrian army, if we reach the line 40 km from our northern border the work will have been done, all fighting will end.

[18] Yekutiel Adam, former Deputy Chief of Staff and designated Head of the Mossad, voiced his concern that the Cabinet was not fully aware of the war's scope and objective.

The IAF interpreted that move as a signal that Syria had no intention of becoming involved in a major war—otherwise the SAMs would have been positioned to defend the approach to Damascus.

[20] The Interior Minister, Yosef Burg, pointed out that a fight against the Syrians seemed imminent, in contrast to what the Cabinet wanted, and that attacking the missiles would only aggravate things and lead to an all-out war.

Kfirs and Skyhawks were along the coastline from Sidon to the outskirts of Beirut, providing close air support for the ground troops and striking at Palestine Liberation Organization targets.

The first task force aircraft attacked the Syrian radar at the top of Jebel Baruk, which was commanding a large area.

[3] Said Eitan, "From the operational point of view I can say that we used the mini-RPVs, long before the war, to identify and locate all the Syrian missile batteries.

[3] Intercepting IAF pilots relied frequently on VHF radio, in hopes of preserving their tactical communications and links to the command post.

Selective airborne communications jamming disrupted the airwaves for the MiG-21s and MiG-23s and cut them off from ground control, making them vulnerable to AWACS-directed attacks from the Israeli F-15s and F-16s.

"[34] Near 4:00 PM, with fourteen batteries destroyed and an hour left until dark, Ivry decided to call off the operation, assuming the optimal result had been achieved and that the Syrians would move more SAMs into place the next day.

[27] Sharon later said that "If we had tolerated that development, the Syrian armored forces would have consisted of 600 tanks protected by an extensive missile umbrella.

[36] A senior IAF officer, widely believed to be Ivry himself, later said that "Syrian aircraft were fighting from a disadvantage, having to respond to the Israeli threat wherever and whenever it materialized, within a general strategic and tactical situation not in Syria's favor.

"[37] Tzipori later wrote in his book that Sharon had been planning the attack since the eve of the war, but tricked the Cabinet into believing that the confrontation with the Syrians was unexpected.

Sharon said he did order the army to prepare for a contingency plan, however, to drive on the Beirut-Damascus highway in case the Syrians attacked first.

On June 9, Assad met with American envoy Habib in Damascus and rejected his terms, demanding that Israel withdraw its forces from Lebanon as a condition for a ceasefire.

[42] The Soviet military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda announced that "sixty-seven Israeli aircraft, including modern US-made F-15 and F-16 fighters, were downed" in the fighting.

The newspaper also reported a meeting with a Syrian airman who recounted an engagement in which he shot down an Israeli F-15: "The victory had not been easy; the enemy had been subtle".