Operation Rösselsprung (1942)

Despite not making contact with the convoy a number of the ships of Unternehmen Rösselsprung were damaged and the heavy cruiser Lützow, ran aground in thick fog, needing three months of repairs.

Rösselsprung was handicapped by complex command arrangements, with authority resting with Hitler and contradictory orders, the forces were instructed to attack and destroy the convoy and to avoid any action that would lead to damage to the capital ships, particularly Tirpitz.

The Leads are sheltered and hidden but difficult to navigate and the battle groups encountered trouble almost immediately; three of Tirpitz's escorting destroyers ran aground and were forced to return to port.

The German naval signals intelligence service (B-Dienst) quickly realized that the convoy was scattering and Schniewind requested permission to sortie.

At 15:00, the flotilla, now consisting of Tirpitz, Hipper and Scheer, with seven destroyers and two torpedo boats, left Altenfjord and headed north-west toward Convoy PQ 17.

Both sighting reports were read by B-Dienst and at 21:30, Erich Raeder, concerned that the fleet was steaming into a trap, ordered its recall just six hours after sailing.

Map showing the position of Jan Mayen
Diagram showing the approximate positions of the ships sunk from Convoy PQ 17