[5] It was launched by Iran on 13 July 1982 near Basra and featured the use of human wave attacks in the largest land battle since World War II.

Saddam Hussein used the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as an excuse to seek an end to the war and send the Palestinians aid.

Iran's ultimate objectives were encapsulated in the popular revolutionary refrain "The road to Jerusalem passes through the Iraqi city of Karbala."

[6] In the years prior, Saddam Hussein took the precautions for an Iranian invasion by stationing large numbers of his forces along the borders.

Though demoralized due to their recent defeats, the armies of Iraq enjoyed better supplies, training, and information than their Iranian counterparts.

The Iraqis also constructed a detailed plan of earthworks and trenches, followed by mine-fields with machine gun, artillery positions and dug-in tanks.

Since tanks would be confronted on the battlefield, the Iranians made use of RPG teams, who carried three grenades and were disciplined in anti-tank warfare.

[6] The Iranian army officers wanted to launch an all-out attack on Baghdad and seize it before the weapon shortages continued to manifest further.

Instead, the decision was made to capture one area of Iraq after the other in the hopes that a series of blows delivered foremost by the Revolutionary Guards Corps would create unrest within the Iraqi Shia society.

[6] The "martyrs" had signed "Passports to Paradise" (as admission forms to the Basij were nicknamed), received a week of basic military training by the Revolutionary Guard, and were sent directly to the front lines.

During this instance, the Iraqis used large amounts of non-lethal tear gas to disrupt the offensive, throwing an entire attacking Iranian division into chaos.

For Iran the additional loss of armor meant a further weakening in power projection and came to further reinforce its inability to conduct sweeping offensives at depth.

Staunch Iraqi defense had managed to wipe out the already understrength Iranian armored divisions involved in the operation, and they had succeeded in doing so right at the border.

In retrospect, the Iranians lacked effective command and control, air support, and logistics to sustain an offensive in the first place.