The objective was to secure the last significant oil reserves still available to the European Axis powers and prevent the Red Army from advancing towards Vienna.

The operation, initially planned for 5 March, began after German units were moved in great secrecy to the Lake Balaton (Plattensee) area.

Many German units were involved, including the 6th Panzer Army and its subordinate Waffen-SS divisions after being withdrawn from the failed Ardennes offensive on the Western Front.

Hitler wanted to secure the extremely vital Nagykanizsa oil fields of southern Hungary, as these were the most strategically valuable assets remaining on the Eastern Front.

But while the 6th Panzer Army was refitting in Germany, Hitler ordered a preliminary offensive with a similar object to be conducted,[16] resulting in Operation Konrad III beginning 18 January.

This bridgehead would jeopardize the upcoming Spring Awakening's southeastern push past Lake Balaton to secure the southern Hungarian oilfields while also exposing a straight route towards Vienna.

During a Situation Conference on 7 January 1945, at which both Hermann Göring and Rundstedt were present, Hitler proposed his intention of pulling the 6th SS Panzer Army to reserve due to severe Allied air attacks.

[24] On this same day, 22 January, Hitler committed to send the fatigued 6th SS Panzer Army to Hungary for his new counteroffensive, a view Heinz Guderian (OKH) partially agreed with.

[23] A glimpse of the ensuing verbal exchange during this argument was captured in Alfred Jodl's (OKW) post-war interrogation, where he quotes Hitler saying: "You want to attack without oil – good, we'll see what happens when you attempt that".

On 27 January, Guderian was tasked by Hitler to stop the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the vicinity of the Margit Line in order to protect the vital oil fields.

[27] The main objectives of the operation were as follows: 1) the security of vital raw materials such as oil, bauxite, and manganese for iron, 2) the defense of arable land for food and crops, the Austrian military industrial complex, and the city of Vienna, and 3) to stop the Soviet advance.

[34] This operational overlap caused by the centralized command led to disagreements, shortages, waste, inefficiencies, and delays, often escalating to the point where Hitler himself would have to give the final ruling on a matter.

[38] The real plan for the units of 6th SS Panzer Army was to travel south through Vienna to their first Hungarian destination, the city of Győr and its surrounding area.

By 7 February, on orders of Hitler, strict secrecy rulings were put into place: death penalty for command infractions, license plates were to be covered, insignia on vehicles and uniforms to be covered, no reconnaissance in forward combat areas, unit movements only by night or overcast conditions, no radio traffic, and the units were not to appear on situation maps.

On 28 February, the start date for Operation Spring Awakening was finally moved back to 6 March, though many commanders felt that a greater delay was necessary.

[45] During the first days of March, alarming reports about road and terrain conditions due to the spring thaw flooded Army Group South Headquarters.

On 3 March, the 6th SS Panzer Army suggested that a naval assault across Lake Balaton itself could be implemented to help the 1st Cavalry Corps on the southeastern edge, but this turned out to be impossible as the spring storms had blown the pack ice against the southern shore.

However, the commanding staff of Army Group E was pessimistic about the LXXXXI Corps' ability to reach Mohács due to the unfavorable terrain and sole dependence on infantry.

[43] On 17 February 1945, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command instructed the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to prepare for an offensive towards Vienna which would begin on March 15.

[22] Knowing that German Panzer divisions were not created for defensive purposes, the Soviet Fronts in Hungary became suspicious of the enemy's intentions.

[50] The security of the lands west of the Danube, particularly in the south which held the Hungarian oil fields, was the Germans' main priority at this stage of the war.

As the 2nd Ukrainian Front held the territory of Budapest and the lands north of the Hungarian capital, defensive preparations in this sector were not paid much attention due to the lower likelihood of attack, but this was not the same in the south.

Other minor differences included the lack or limited use of barbed wire installations, anti-tank obstacles, and bunkers,[52] although the 4th Guards Army command did suggest placing the burnt out wrecks of 38 previously destroyed German tanks into advantageous positions; it is unclear how many were actually set up.

[54] The 26th Army's Corps' would be layered in two belts whose defensive preparations had originally begun back on 11 February,[54] prior to any sign of German offensive intentions.

[57] Because of the serious tank losses of January–February along the Margit line, Marshal Tolbukhin ordered that no Front/Army level counter-attacks were to take place, and local tactical attacks should be very limited; the only objective was to hold the Front and grind down the German offensive.

It was not uncommon for the Soviets to actually search out and exploit the boundaries between the OKW and OKH as they knew these areas would suffer from poorer military command;[59] the advance to Budapest is an example.

Dietrich's army made "good progress" at first, but as they drew near the Danube, the combination of the muddy terrain and strong Soviet resistance had ground the German advance to a halt.

On the 15 March, strength returns on this day show the Hohenstaufen Division with 35 Panther tanks, 20 Panzer IVs, 32 Jagdpanzers, 25 Sturmgeschützes and 220 other self-propelled weapons and armoured cars.

"[70] The failure of the operation resulted in the "armband order" that was issued by Hitler to Dietrich, who claimed that the troops, and more importantly, the Leibstandarte, "did not fight as the situation demanded.

After new territory had been captured, Soviet collection teams scoured the countryside and towns to document and photograph knocked out Axis vehicles and tanks.