Malta could not be revived as an offensive base and to provide some aviation fuel for the defending fighters, the British resorted to the expedient of running supplies through the blockade by submarine.

By the end of February, 11 ships had crossed without escort and an intelligence blackout caused by a change to the C 38m machine in early March made little difference to the British for lack of means.

It would also be known if Luftwaffe aircraft had been diverted to the Russian Front and if the crisis in the Indian Ocean had abated, sufficient for ships to escort a fast convoy from Alexandria.

[7] Operation Hercules (Operazione C3) was an Axis plan to invade Malta and during 1942, reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in Sicily and the bombing campaign against the island led to speculation that it was the prelude to invasion.

The absence of evidence from signals intelligence and air reconnaissance led to a conclusion that an invasion was not imminent but the need to protect the source of information meant that this was not disclosed by the British.

[8][9] Hitler was lukewarm about the operation, in case the Italian navy left down German airborne forces but the capture of Tobruk in mid-June made it appear that the invasion was unnecessary.

[10][11] After the success of Operation Crusader (18 November – 30 December 1941), the Eighth Army advanced 500 mi (800 km) west to El Agheila in Libya, capturing airfields and landing grounds useful for air cover for Malta convoys.

By 6 February, the British had been defeated, forced to retreat east of the Jebel Akhdar back to the Gazala line just west of Tobruk, where Panzerarmee had begun its retirement seven weeks earlier.

The coastal 201 Group would provide reconnaissance and anti-submarine sorties and a small sabotage party was to land on Crete to attack Axis aircraft on the ground.

The operation was to have 26 destroyers, ten from the Eastern Fleet, four corvettes, two minesweepers to clear the Malta approaches, four Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) and two rescue ships.

Two Italian MAS-boats and six E-boats lay in ambush between Crete and Cyrenaica and the 7th Cruiser Division (it:Ammiraglio di divisione [Vice-Admiral] Alberto Da Zara) with Raimondo Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia in Palermo and the destroyers Ascari, Alfredo Oriani, Lanzerotto Malocello, Premuda and Vivaldi in Cagliari waited for Harpoon, along with MAS-boats and a large number of aircraft to operate in the western basin of the Mediterranean.

Convoy MW 11b sailed from Alexandria with Potaro, the tanker Bulkoil, the decommissioned battleship Centurion, carrying supplies and operating as a decoy, the rescue ships Malines and Antwerp, escorted by five destroyers and four corvettes.

[32] During the afternoon Lehrgeschwader 1 was more circumspect until the convoy was beyond the cover of the short-range British fighters, then from 4:30 a.m., about 60–70 bombers made seven attacks in five hours, opposed by a few long-range Kittyhawks and Beaufighters.

[37] At 11:15 p.m. Harwood signalled Vian that the Italian fleet (Admiral Angelo Iachino) with two battleships, two heavy and two light cruisers and 12 destroyers had sailed from Taranto and would reach the convoy by 7:00 a.m.[38][d] Vian requested permission to turn back as it would be impossible for the escorts to protect the merchantmen for another long summer day and Harwood ordered Vigorous to continue towards Malta until 2:00 a.m. on 15 June, then turn onto a reciprocal course.

[26] The turn order was given at 1:45 a.m., a hazardous manoeuvre for a large group of ships out of position, full of tired crews and menaced by Axis torpedo-boats and U-boats.

As the turn was made the cruisers fell back and were attacked by the 3rd Schnellbootflottille (Leutnant-zur-See Siegfried Wuppermann); S 56 fired first at 3:50 a.m. and hit Newcastle with one torpedo head on, which was screened by destroyers as damage-control parties worked on the damage and Newcastle soon worked back up to 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph) The destroyer HMS Hasty was hit by S 55 at 5:25 a.m., 12 men were killed and the ship was so badly damaged that it was sunk by Hotspur.

Maydon found that Umbra was ...in the unenviable position of being in the centre of a fantastic circus of wildly careering capital ships, cruisers and destroyers...of tracer-shell streaks and anti-aircraft bursts...there was not a quadrant of the compass unoccupied by enemy vessels weaving to and fro....[yet] It was essential to remain at periscope depth, for an opportunity to fire might come at any moment.Italian cruiser Trento was circled by the battleships, which then resumed their southward course, leaving it behind with the destroyer Antonio Pigafetta; at 6:46 a.m. Maydon fired torpedoes at Italian battleship Vittorio Veneto, with no hits.

[43] The battlefleet continued south in two groups and eight US and one British B-24 bomber attacked at 9:00 a.m. from 14,000 ft (4,300 m) and accurately bombed, hitting Littorio with a 500 lb (230 kg)-bomb with little effect.

As the B-24s turned away, five 39 Squadron Beauforts from Bir Amud arrived at low level, having set off at 6:25 a.m. to synchronise their attack with the B-24s, minus their Beaufighter escort, which had been diverted to the ground battle.

It was only at 11:15 a.m. that Harwood and Tedder discovered that aircraft from Malta had engaged the Italian battlefleet and received the exaggerated claims of torpedo hits, including those on the battleships.

Convoy MW 11 was under attack when the signal arrived and after waiting for two hours for a reply, Harwood ordered that only the four fastest merchantmen, Arethusa and two destroyers should make a dash for Malta.

[48] German bombers in Libya flew 193 sorties against Vigorous from 14 to 15 June which gave some respite to the Eighth Army as it retreated towards the Egyptian frontier but left RAF landing grounds around Gambut vulnerable to attack.

[50][51] Another Axis air attack had no effect and during the night the convoy zig-zagged eastwards at 13 kn (24 km/h; 15 mph), with Nestor falling behind, down at the bow, towed by Javelin and escorted by Eridge and Beaufort.

[54] By the time that the Italian battleships had been ordered back, the convoy and escorts lacked the ammunition to continue and seven long-range Beaufighters had been lost, depriving Vigorous of air cover while beyond the reach of short-range fighters.

Communications had been inadequate, with some signals taking too long to arrive but Playfair wrote that without airfields in the west of Cyrenaica, even quick and accurate reports would not have compensated.

Harwood was right that the bomber and torpedo-bomber force was too small and had not compensated for the lack of battleships and with Axis aircraft based along the length of the route to Malta, air power had decided the course of events.

The only success in Operation Julius was the arrival of two of the Harpoon ships at Malta; on land, Tobruk surrendered a few days after Convoy MW 11 returned to port and by late June, the Eighth Army had retreated to El Alamein.

Welshman made its third trip and arrived on 16 July; at the end of the month the 10th Submarine Flotilla returned and the minesweepers with Harpoon had reduced the mine danger in the Malta approaches.

Losses forced the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica to increase the number of fighter sorties per bomber and then to resort to hit and run attacks by fighter-bombers.

After Pedestal, submarines returned to Malta and Supermarine Spitfires flown from the aircraft-carrier HMS Furious enabled a maximum effort to be made against Axis ships.