The goal of the operation was the destruction of a salient around the central Bosnian town of Jajce, which was held by the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane – HVO) and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine – ARBiH).

The ARBiH and HVO in Jajce were not only outnumbered and outgunned, but their units were also plagued by inadequate staff work, compounded by lack of coordination between separate command and control structures maintained by the two forces throughout the battle.

[4] The JNA and the VRS in Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine – ARBiH) and the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane – HVO), reporting to the Bosniak-dominated central government and the Bosnian Croat leadership respectively, as well as the Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska – HV), which occasionally supported HVO operations.

[12] While the fighting related to Operation Corridor 92 was still in progress, the VRS prepared to attack and destroy a salient around the town of Jajce in central part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held jointly by the HVO and the ARBiH.

[17] Besides the numerical superiority, the VRS held a clear advantage in armour, deploying 20–30 tanks and adding 30–50 heavy artillery pieces to the force.

[20] In July, the VRS attempted to cut the supply corridor and isolate Jajce from Travnik before any effort was made to capture the salient, but the attacks failed to accomplish any significant headway.

[21] A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis concluded that it is possible that the failure of the ARBiH–HVO counterattack prompted the HVO to agree on a short-lived truce with the VRS in early October.

[27] Blaškić's position was weakened by the HVO headquarters since 18 October, when a quarter of heavy weapons at his disposal were removed to Čapljina, ahead of HV's Operation Vlaštica aimed at Dubrovnik hinterland.

The battle began on 23 October,[29] just after the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) managed to calm the situation in Vitez and Novi Travnik.

[33] They were joined by the civilian population of Jajce, forming a column of between 30,000[20] and 40,000[34] refugees that stretched 16 kilometres (10 miles), and among which thousands were vulnerable to VRS sniping and shelling.

[38] In the weeks following its capture, all of the mosques and Roman Catholic churches in Jajce were demolished as retribution for the HVO's destruction of the town's only Serbian Orthodox monastery in mid-October.

[39] While the conflict between the HVO and the ARBiH contributed to the weakening defence of Jajce, the military superiority of the VRS was the principal reason behind the town's capture.

Besides the advantage in troop size and firepower, VRS staff work and planning was significantly superior to the organisational efforts of the defenders of Jajce.

[40] The principal problem for the defence of Jajce was that the town was defended by two separate command structures, one having authority over ARBiH troops and the other over HVO units.

[41] Humanitarian workers and foreign military observers had suspicions that the Croats deliberately abandoned Jajce, as well as territories lost in Operation Corridor 92, to the VRS in exchange for the Prevlaka Peninsula south of Dubrovnik.

[46] In October 1993, VRS Major General Momir Talić, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps during Operation Vrbas '92, said that the capture of Jajce was the first step in dismantling of the alliance between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks.

[53] In 2010, the Prosecutor's Office began an investigation against seven members of the ARBiH, HVO, and HOS on suspicion that they committed war crimes between 27 May and 29 October 1992 against 35 Serb civilians, including the murder of at least 15.