That eventually led to commencing the permitenttrafik and the transition of the Engelbrecht Division but also lessened the immediate risk of Sweden being a theatre of war between the Axis and the Allies.
[citation needed] With the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, as a major proponent, the Allies decided to commence Operation Wilfred and to mine the Norwegian waters close to Narvik.
[citation needed] The Altmark Incident on February 16 convinced Hitler that the Allies would not respect Norwegian neutrality and so he ordered plans for an invasion.
In 1928, German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener had pointed out the necessity for Germany to occupy Norwegian naval bases to threaten British sea lanes in an eventual war against the United Kingdom.
Denmark's position in the Baltic Sea made the country also important for the control of the naval and shipping access to major German and Russian harbours.
The war ended by the Moscow Peace Treaty on 12 March 1940, but after Germany invaded Denmark and Norway on 9 April, that force was under demobilisation.
[citation needed] In Norway, the plan called for the capture of six primary targets by amphibious landings in Oslo, Kristiansand, Egersund, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik.
The plan was designed to overwhelm the Norwegian defenders quickly and to occupy the vital areas before any form of organized resistance could be mounted.
After the operation, Hitler wrote in a letter to Sweden's King Gustaf V, dated 24 April 1940:[citation needed] "I have no doubt that our action, (the invasion of Norway and Denmark), which at the last moment forestalled the execution of the Allied plan and which under all circumstances will stop France and England from getting a foothold in Scandinavia, will have consequences which will be a blessing to the Scandinavian peoples".
[4] Sweden organised its mobilization system so that a personal order by letter was possible as an alternative to official proclamations, which led to 320,000 men being raised in a few weeks.
[citation needed] The impressive and successful operation led to a Swedish tendency to overrate the German capabilities in staging coup-like invasions.