Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the supreme command of the German armed forces, had issued standing orders for Luftwaffe–Kriegsmarine co-operation in naval operations.

[3] Grand admiral (Großadmiral) Erich Raeder, the head of the Seekriegsleitung (Maritime Warfare Command) of the Kriegsmarine (War Navy) sought to disrupt the activities of British trawlers around the Dogger Bank, which were suspected of spying, possibly to find the swept channels in the Westwall minefield belt.

[5][a] The crews were ready by 6:00 a.m. on 22 February and began to take off at 4:00 p.m. Visibility over the North Sea was estimated at 30 nmi (56 km; 35 mi) with a full moon to the south-east.

[5] The first bomber airborne was 1H+IM, flown by Feldwebel Jäger who headed north, then used the south end of Sylt as a route marker and flew on a bearing of 241° towards the Humber at 3,300 ft (1,000 m).

[8] At about 6:00 p.m. on 22 February, a telephone call was made on behalf of Admiral Otto Ciliax, the chief of staff of Marinegruppe West, with a request that aircraft already in the air be limited to attacks off the English coast; this was impossible because Fliegerkorps X did not have the codes.

The flotilla, operating from their anchorage near Wilhelmshaven off Schillig, was proceeding quickly towards Weg 1, a 6 nmi (11 km; 6.9 mi)-wide swept channel of the Westwall, a defensive minefield protecting the German Bight.

[7] While hesitating to attack, the Heinkel was fired on with 20 mm anti-aircraft guns by Richard Beitzen and Erich Koellner, whose officers thought that they had identified a British aircraft.

At 7:43 p.m. Men on Max Schultz saw the aircraft come out of a cloud bank with the moon astern of it and transmitted "Flugzeug ist gesichtet worden in der schwarzen Wolke des Mondes" ("Aeroplane has been sighted in the black cloud in front of the moon") as Jäger made a bombing run at 4,900 ft (1,500 m), convinced by the gunfire from the ship that it was hostile.

As the other ships turned to assist the ship, Berger ordered them back into formation, lest they strayed out of the swept channel but reversed course at 7:46 p.m.. Friedrich Eckoldt slowly approached Leberecht Maass, making rescue and towing equipment ready and was 1,600 ft (500 m) distant when the aircraft returned for a second bombing run and hit Leberecht Maass with two bombs out of four.

A big fireball rose from around the stern funnel and those above deck on Friedrich Eckoldt saw that Leberecht Maass had broken in two and was sinking in 130 ft (40 m) as the Heinkel departed to the west.

[7] The other destroyers manoeuvred towards Leberecht Maass, Erich Koellner stopping engines to drift towards the survivors in the water between the two halves of the ship, sending "An alle.

With lifeboats swung out, ready to begin the rescue, Erich Koellner, along with those of Friedrich Eckoldt and Richard Beitzen began taking on survivors.

Max Schultz, still not replying to wireless calls, had struck one of the 120 mines laid in Weg 1 by the British destroyers HMS Ivanhoe and Intrepid on the night of 10/11 January.

[9][11] During the evening, Fliegerkorps X received information from KG 26 that one of its aircraft had attacked a ship, about 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi) north of the Terschellingerbank lightvessel.

The attack on a steamer near Terschellng Bank is most regrettable and contravenes the regulations issued to the Luftwaffe for the conduct of war on merchant shipping.

"[12]At 8:36 p.m. after thirty minutes of confusion, including reports of torpedo tracks and periscopes, Berger ordered the four surviving ships to return to base ("An alle.

[14] The dispatch of a Vorpostenboot to search for survivors was cancelled due to thick fog and at 0:32 p.m. on 23 February a He 111 flying over the island of Borkum, was shot down by navy anti-aircraft guns.

[12] In 2014, Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmolke wrote that the British destroyers Ivanhoe and Intrepid had laid 120 tethered mines on the night of 10/11 January, roughly in the area that Leberecht Maass and Max Schultz sank.

[15] The inquiry concluded that reports of submarines, indiscriminate firing of anti-aircraft guns and general excitement contributed to the uncertainty about the timing of events.