Operations Ginny I and II
Their aim was to blow up railway tunnels that would cut the line of communication to German forces in central Italy.
The first mission, Ginny I, occurred on February 27/28, 1944, when fifteen U.S. soldiers attempted to land west of the small town of Framura.
Although the OSS members were properly uniformed, they were summarily executed on March 26 under Hitler's Commando Order of 1942 at the command of German General Anton Dostler.
In the early days of the OSS, it initially lacked experience, resources, and the respect of skeptical staff officers in the theater.
However, the OSS proved its value by establishing contacts with Allied sympathizers and gathered intelligence vital to the invasion prior to Operation Torch and organized warrior tribesmen into a guerrilla force to guard against a possible Axis thrust through Spanish Morocco into the Allied rear with bilingual U.S. officers during the North African Campaign.
The OSS then established the Operational Group (OG) to recruit second generation American soldiers with language facility who, if organized in small groups and trained with commando capabilities, could be parachuted into enemy occupied territory to harass the enemy and to encourage and support local resistance organizations.
During the landings on the Italian mainland at Salerno in September 1943, an OSS detachment provided Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby's Rangers with critical intelligence during their defense of the Sorrento Peninsula.
After the USAAF bombing raids on mountainous terrain roads along the Italian coast during Operation Strangle failed in damaging the German supply lines, the OSS discussed the use of sabotage teams.
On January 9, 1944, the OSS proposed the destruction of tunnels between Levanto and Bonassola, a segment in the Genoa-La Spezia rail line.
The rocky walls of the tunnels were thought to consist chiefly of the serpentine type, making them less vulnerable to demolition.
A captured Italian officer who had recently traveled over the line reported that there were few guards along the coast between Genoa and La Spezia.
Carmine Armando, T/5 John Lepore, T/5 Vittorio Amoruso, and T/5 Thomas Savino—were replaced by T/5 Joseph M. Farrell, T/5 Liberty J. Tremonte, T/5 Santoro Calcara, and Sgt Alfred L. De Flumeri for this mission.
However, the departure was delayed by 45 minutes after the lead boat with the working party on board had to be replaced due to a faulty radar.
[3] Both the working and security parties landed at what they thought was the right spot and were properly dressed in U.S. Army uniforms and had no civilian clothes with them.
The senior officer afloat rejected this suggestion because according to the plan, the team had to complete the sabotage mission and rendezvous back to the PT boats by 0330 hrs—0400 hrs at the latest—in order to distance themselves from the Ligurian coast and to avoid German patrol before sunrise.
A contingency plan was developed i.e. if the team were unable to complete the mission in time, they would return to the shore to be picked up by PT boats.
An Italian farmer named Franco Lagaxo saw Russo and Mauro approaching his cottage who identified themselves as U.S. soldiers and was asked if he could buy food for them.
On the evening of March 23, the U.S. PT boats were launched to accomplish the pickup per the contingency plan in order to make prearranged radio contact with the OSS team.
On the next morning of March 25, the information about the capture of U.S. soldiers and the purpose of the mission was then sent to General of the Infantry Anton Dostler at the 75th German Army Corps headquarters.
Dostler at first informed his superior, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commanding general of all German forces in Italy, about the captured U.S. commandos and what to do with them.
[12] General Dostler was captured by U.S. forces on May 8, 1945, and brought to trial before an American military tribunal at the seat of the Supreme Allied Commander, the Royal Palace in Caserta on October 8, 1945.
Then, when questioned why they were found in U.S. uniforms, he said that they wore no distinctive markings that distinguished themselves as Americans and therefore received no protection under the rules of war (which was rebuffed since the dead OSS men had insignia of their U.S. Army ranks).
[14] The commission stated that "[n]o soldier, and still less a Commanding General, can be heard to say that he considered the summary shooting of prisoners of war legitimate even as a reprisal.
"[15] Four days later, the trial unanimously found General Dostler guilty of war crimes, rejecting his defense of superior orders.
