The relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States have a long history, with roots before American independence due to long-standing trade between the two regions.

[9] Sinan Kuneralp, author of "Ottoman Diplomatic and Consular Personnel in the United States of America, 1867–1917," wrote that the empire initially apparently lacked "any sensible justification" to open a mission stateside due to the relative distance between the countries.

[8] Wasti wrote that "there was no real rush on the Ottoman side to send diplomatic envoys to Washington, DC".

[10] Two Ottoman officials, one being Edouard Blak Bey, who sensed the rise of the United States, unsuccessfully advocated for installing a mission in the U.S. during the early 1850s.

He cited the cases of then-minister to Florence Rüstem Bey and Osman Nizami Pasha, who declined in 1867 and 1912, respectively.

As a result, he terminated the credentials of envoy Mustafa Shekib, and chose not to upgrade the mission to embassy status.

"[19] Abdul Hamid used his position as caliph to order the Sulu Sultan not to resist and not fight the invading Americans.

[21] Despite Sulu's "pan-Islamic" ideology, he readily acceded to Straus' request to avoid hostilities between the West and Muslims.

As the Moros have never asked more than that, it is not surprising, that they refused all overtures made, by Aguinaldo's agents, at the time of the Filipino insurrection.

President McKinley sent a personal letter of thanks to Mr. Straus for the excellent work he had done, and said, its accomplishment had saved the United States at least twenty thousand troops in the field.

If the reader will pause to consider what this means in men and also the millions in money, he will appreciate this wonderful piece of diplomacy, in averting a holy war.

[28] During the Presidency of William Howard Taft, an American strategy was to become involved in business transactions rather than military confrontations, a policy known as Dollar Diplomacy.

It failed with respect to the Ottoman Empire because of opposition from US ambassador Oscar Straus and to Turkish vacillation under pressure from the entrenched European powers who did not wish to see American competition.

[44][45] Kuneralp stated that these officials were "interesting figures" but that there was not "a Wellington Koo" among them and "they did not shine in their diplomatic careers", as the Ottoman government did not view this post to be important.