On the night of 26/27 October 1942, the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade (part of the 7th Motor Brigade), with thirteen 6-pounder anti-tank guns and the 239th Battery, 76th (Royal Welch Fusiliers) Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery, with six more 6-pounders, was ordered to occupy a desert feature known as Snipe, a small depression in the landscape 1.5 mi (2.4 km) south-west of Kidney Ridge that was suitable for an outpost.

The defence of Outpost Snipe managed to spoil the biggest Axis counter-attack against the positions captured by the Eighth Army during Operation Lightfoot; the battalion suffered 72 casualties.

The fighting at Outpost Snipe led Rommel to write that an armoured attack, on ground which the defenders had been able to prepare, was unlikely to succeed.

[2] In the north, four infantry divisions of XXX Corps were to advance on a 16 mi (26 km) front to the Oxalic Line, an objective beyond the forward Axis outposts.

The Eighth Army headquarters decided to end the bickering by having the troops light flares, which would be mapped from several locations to triangulate their positions but this took place too late to affect the operation.

[9] Arguments about the location of infantry and tank units after Operation Lightfoot had not been resolved by a reconnaissance during the morning, as the flare-firing exercise had not begun, which left Turner in doubt about the battalion start line and the position of the objective.

After the flares had been lit the confusion persisted, because the tanks units refused to accept the evidence that their map reading was even worse than that of the infantry.

[13] The C Company carrier platoon patrolled to the west and found about 160 Axis soldiers ready to surrender but before infantry arrived to collect them, the platoon ran into a laager of about 35 Italian tanks (XII Armoured Battalion from the 133rd Armoured Division "Littorio") and German tanks, Panzerjäger (self-propelled anti-tank guns) and infantry (Kampfgruppe Stiffelmayer).

[15] Kampfgruppe Stiffelmayer broke camp and formed two columns, one moving towards the laager to the north and one straight towards the south-west part of Outpost Snipe, where C and B companies were placing their anti-tank guns.

Part of Kampfgruppe Stiffelmeyer had spent the night in a dip, reappeared 800 yd (730 m) to the south-west of Snipe and also moved with their sides exposed to the British 6-pounders.

Turner sent an officer back in a Bren Gun Carrier, who managed to get the most advanced tanks to stop after thirty minutes but the rest kept firing.

[14] The German tanks were broadside on again and the British gunners immediately hit and set three more on fire; the 47th RTR machine-gunned the crews as they tried to escape.

By 8:30 a.m. the 47th RTR had arrived at Snipe, which attracted a storm of artillery-fire and the outpost disappeared again in smoke, fire, explosions and flying sand.

[20] The battalion Medical Officer and the ambulances had been left behind at the start line on 26 October and had been unable to move forward in daylight; the loss of the FOO during the night, made it impossible to direct plunging fire on the Axis artillery and tanks hidden in dips around the post.

The outpost was also running short of ammunition and three carriers were loaded with the most badly wounded men, dashed for the ridge to the east and reached safety.

The battalion ambulances and supply lorries were behind the ridge ready to move, along with a replacement FOO but nothing could make the return journey through the Axis artillery and machine-gun fire, which began as soon as a vehicle appeared above the crest.

Around 10:00 a.m., Italian infantry were seen assembling opposite the western face of the outpost and carriers from a scout platoon sallied from the post to disperse them, inflicting many casualties and destroying two vehicles towing captured 6-pounders.

[21] Just as the guns were readied, thirteen Italian M13/40 tanks from the XIII Battalion appeared over the ridge to the west and about twenty German tanks of Kampfgruppe Stiffelmeyer used the attack as cover to advance from the hull-down ambush position to counter-attack the 24th Armoured Brigade, which had retired to similar positions behind the ridge to the east.

[22] The anti-tank guns along the western flank of Snipe opened fire and hit four Italian tanks at once, causing the rest to return to cover.

Briggs ordered forward the 2nd Armoured Brigade artillery, the 11th RHA and they drove their M7 Priests up the east side of the ridge to bombard Axis positions but managed only to hit Snipe again with 105 mm howitzer fire.

As the 2nd Rifle Brigade had retired they had passed unseen by the relieving battalion, which dug in before dawn about 1,000 yd (910 m) south-east of Outpost Snipe.

The attempt of the 1st Armoured Division to provide artillery support backfired, due to the chronic inability of the British commanders to agree where their units were (even after the location exercise with flares).

[31] Rommel had ordered a counter-attack by the Panzerarmee reserve, to restore the original German positions on a 6 mi (10 km) front from El Wishka in the south to Point 29 in the north, which had been lost during Operation Lightfoot.

[33] The 2nd Rifle Brigade suffered 72 casualties but a month later, a committee of investigation concluded that the battalion had managed to knock out 52 to 57 Axis vehicles, of which 22 German and 10 Italian tanks had been destroyed, along with five self-propelled guns.