Parker immunity doctrine

The doctrine is named for the Supreme Court of the United States case in which it was initially developed, Parker v.

[1] The rationale behind Parker immunity is that Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, evidenced no intent to restrain state behavior.

[2] For the doctrine to apply, the state must act as a sovereign, rather than as a "participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade.

[3] Antitrust laws do not bar anticompetitive restraints that sovereign states impose "as an act of government".

"The general language of the Sherman Act should not be interpreted to prohibit anticompetitive actions by the States in their governmental capacities as sovereign regulators.

"[16] Given its focus on the problems of private monopolies and combinations, it is not surprising that the Sherman Act does not set out to curb clearly defined anticompetitive state actions.

Applying Midcal is unnecessary if the alleged antitrust injury was the direct result of a clear sovereign state act.

'[23] However, when it is uncertain whether an act should be treated as state action for the purposes of Parker immunity, courts apply the test set forth in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. (1980)[24] to "determine whether anticompetitive conduct engaged in by private parties should be deemed state action and thus shielded from the antitrust laws.

"[31] This clearly articulated state policy may be inferred "if suppression of competition is the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes".

'"[34] A government entity need not "be able to point to a specific, detailed, legislative authorization" to assert a successful Parker defense.

"Such active state review is clearly necessary where private defendants are empowered with some type of discretionary authority in connection with the anticompetitive acts (e.g. to determine price or rate structures).

A state must independently review and approve the anticompetitive behavior to satisfy this prong of the Parker doctrine.

[40] A "hybrid restraint" is discussed by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in Rice v. Norman Williams Co..[41] They are not purely private actions, nor are they entirely attributable to the state in the manner of a legislative act.

Hybrid restraints are not the type of sovereign state action found in Massachusetts School of Law or Zimomra, that avoid Midcal treatment.