As of June 30, 2010, the United States had allocated US$2.05 billion to the Iraqi oil and gas sector to begin this modernization, but ended its direct involvement as of the first quarter of 2008.
According to reports by various U.S. government agencies, multilateral institutions and other international organizations, long-term Iraq reconstruction costs could reach $100 billion (US) or higher.
During the period, IPC monopolized oil exploration inside the Red Line; excluding Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where ARAMCO (formed in 1944 by renaming of the Saudi subsidiary of Standard Oil of California (Socal)) and Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) respectively held controlling position.
[10] After Muhammad Mossadegh nationalized the oil industry in Iran, IPC agreed to accept an "equal profit sharing" arrangement in 1952.
After seizing control of the Iraqi government, Qasim demanded better terms from IPC but decided against nationalization of Iraq's petroleum assets.
By this time the Ba'ath Party was in power in Iraq and Saddam Hussein was its de facto ruler, although Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr did not formally step down as President until 1979.
Iraqis remained divided over provisions allowing regional governments to enter into contracts directly with foreign companies; while strongly supported by Kurds, Sunni Arabs wanted the Oil Ministry to retain signing power.
As a compromise the draft law proposed that a new body called the Federal Oil and Gas Council would be created that could, in some circumstances, prevent execution of contracts signed by regional governments.
A major challenge to Iraq's development of the oil sector is that resources are not evenly divided across sectarian-demographic lines.
The majority of the known oil and gas reserves in Iraq form a belt that runs along the eastern edge of the country.
Which is a new all-time peak year for Iraq if OPEC talks about freezing or reduce production held in April 2016 will not led to a reduction.
[17] The company's geographical operation area spans the following governorates: Kirkuk, Nineveh, Erbil, Baghdad, Diyala, and part of Babil to Hilla and Wasit to Kut.
The remainder falls under the jurisdiction of the SOC and MOC, and though smaller in geographical size, includes the majority of proven reserves.
Both Iraqi refining and export infrastructure are currently bottlenecks and need to be upgraded to process much more crude oil.
However, fresh water is an important commodity in the Middle East, and large amounts of seawater will likely have to be pumped in via pipelines that have yet to be built.
To the South: The 1.65 million bbl/d Iraq Pipeline to Saudi Arabia (IPSA) has been closed since 1991 following the Persian Gulf War.
Iraq has also held discussions to build a crude oil pipeline from Haditha to Jordan's port of Aqaba.
The Basra Oil Terminal on the Persian Gulf has an effective capacity to load 1.3 million bbl/d and support Very Large Crude Carriers.
There are five smaller ports on the Persian Gulf, all functioning at less than full capacity, including the Khor al-Amaya terminal.
In addition, Iraq has resumed shipping oil to Jordan's Zarqa refinery by road tankers at a rate of 10,000 bbl/d.
Despite improvements in recent years, the sector has not been able to meet domestic demand of about 600,000 bbl/d, and the refineries produce too much heavy fuel oil and not enough other refined products.
To alleviate product shortages, Iraq's 10-year strategic plan for 2008-2017 set a goal of increasing refining capacity to 1.5 million bbl/d, and is seeking $20 billion in investments to achieve this target.
The agreement, which originally was to cover all of Basra Governorate, has been modified to include only the associated gas from the Rumaila, Zubair, and West Qurna Phase I projects.
Iraq has planned an upstream bidding round in late 2010 for three non-associated natural gas fields with combined reserves of over 7.5 Tcf.
The proposed AGP pipeline would deliver gas from Iraq's Akkas field to Syria and then on to Lebanon and the Turkish border sometime in 2010, and then on to Europe.