The division guarded Highway 4, the major rice supply route to the Mekong Delta, and protected the roads and towns of Tây Ninh, Hậu Nghĩa and Long An provinces (with a total of fourteen districts).

Strong Vietcong forces operated in both Hau Hậu Nghĩa and Long An, close to the capital, but the 25th, although reinforced by four Ranger battalions, appeared unable to come to grips with the local VC, or otherwise interfere with their activities.

The corps senior adviser had requested Chinh's immediate relief, but Westmoreland chose not to press the matter, hoping that combined operations with American forces "will be able to develop the unit."

For example, when Hunnicutt recommended the removal of the Cu Chi district chief for blatant graft and corruption, Chinh unofficially acknowledged the situation but explained that his personal friendship with the accused prevented him from acting.

Hunnicutt, however, reported both the case and Chinh's views to Mueller, who promptly informed General Lê Nguyên Khang, the new III Corps commander.

He also believed that Chinh was cognizant of his critical monthly evaluation (SAME) reports, but unaware that MACV routinely passed on much of the information directly to the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS).

On 28 September he sent a memorandum to Khang, accusing Hunnicutt of submitting "sneaky reports on his division, threatening to pull advisors from units and of being insulting to the 46th and 50th Regiments."

[1]: 189–90 Upon Hunnicutt's scheduled departure two months later, Chinh made the dispute public through a special "order of the day" to his troops and a slightly more detailed letter to his commanders.

Chinh's accusations were quickly picked up, first by the Vietnamese and then by the American press, causing a sensation in Washington and forcing MACV to take a closer look at the matter.

Neither Heintges nor Westmoreland believed Chinh's explanation, but felt that his regret was sincere and that Hunnicutt "may have been a little too aggressive in his approach to this supersensitive, complex ridden, apprehensive, unsure, and relatively weak division commander."

Heintges considered Chinh's excuse plausible enough for public relations purposes, allowing him to rescind the statements on the pretext that outsiders had misunderstood them.

"[1]: 245 In August 1967 JGS Chairman General Cao Văn Viên finally provided Westmoreland with a list of about forty "corrupt, incompetent or old and tired" senior officers that he intended to discharge after the South Vietnamese presidential election scheduled for September.