He was an Academic sceptic, like Clitomachus and Carneades before him, but he offered a more moderate view of skepticism than that of his teachers, permitting provisional beliefs without certainty.
After his death in 84/3 BC, the Academy seceded into rivalling factions and eventually disappeared until the Neoplatonist revival.
He maintained that by means of conceptive notions (katalêptikê phantasia) objects could not be comprehended (akatalêpta), but were comprehensible according to their nature.
[5] How he understood the latter, whether he referred to the evidence and accordance of the sensations which we receive from things,[6] or whether he had returned to the Platonic assumption of an immediate spiritual perception, is not clear.
At least on the one hand, even though he would not resist the evidence of the sensations, he wished even here to meet with antagonists who would endeavour to refute his positions[6] i.e. he felt the need of subjecting afresh what he had provisionally set down in his own mind as true to the examination of scepticism; and on the other hand, he did not doubt of arriving at a sure conviction respecting the ultimate end of life.